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democratic framework and in turn posed an existential challenge to US hegemony. This case-study
analysis presents a novel understanding of South Korea’s political processes and the ramifications of US
influence on nascent nation-states. By placing the people’s movements of Jeju and Gwangju in
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Abridged Timeline: Important Dates
Post-Japanese Surrender
August 15, 1945

Japan accepts Potsdam Declaration and formally surrenders WWII

September 8, 1945

US forces arrive in Incheon and set up USAFIK

December 16, 1945

US, UK, and USSR meet at Moscow Conference and release joint
declaration formalizing a five-year trusteeship over Korea

November 14, 1947

UN General Assembly Resolution 112 establishes UN Temporary
Commission on Korea (UNTCOK)

October 21, 1949

UN General Assembly Resolution 293 recognizes only South
Korea’s government as legal

June 25, 1950

UN Security Council passes Resolution 82 authorizing US
intervention into Korea and subsequently the Korean War

July 27, 1953

Korean Armistice Agreement signed by UNC, KPA, and Chinese
People’s Volunteer Army

Jeju
September 28, 1945 Japanese sign formal surrender of Jeju Island to US
March 1, 1947

Police kill six and injure over a dozen others at March 1
celebration event of Korean independence movement

February 26, 1948

UNTCOK passes resolution for a separate election in South Korea

April 3, 1948

Start date of Jeju 4.3 Struggle

May 10, 1948

Korean general election

August 28, 1948

Peace Agreement between rebel commander Kim Dal-sam and
commander Kim Ik-ryeol (General William F. Dean (USAMGIK)
rejects peace Agreement)

November 17, 1948

President Rhee declares martial law in Jeju Province

May 10, 1949

Rescheduled elections for Jeju and rebel leader Lee Deok-gu
killed by police
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September 21, 1954 Official end of Jeju 4.3 Struggle after Jeju police lift quarantine
Gwangju
October 18, 1979

Martial-law declared in city of Busan and a city-wide curfew in
city of Masan

October 26, 1979

President Park Chung-Hee assassinated by Chief of Korean CIA
Kim Chae-gyu

December 12, 1979

Military coup by Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo

May 15, 1980

150,000 person protest at Seoul station

May 17, 1980

Martial law officially extended to all of South Korea;
Closure of all university campuses;
Arrest of popular opposition leader Kim Dae Jung

May 18, 1980

Student protests at Chonnam National University, official start of
the Gwangju Uprising

May 19, 1980

Special Warfare Brigades are sent in and

May 20, 1980

City-wide protest with 30,000-40,000 participants

May 21, 1980

Military en-masse shoots at protestors leaving hundreds injured
and at least fifty-four killed, leading to creation of Citizens’ Army

May 22, 1980

CSC formed by local government to negotiate with Marital Law
troops, and SSC created in backlash

May 26, 1980

Martial troops re-enter Gwangju and protestors respond with
“March of Death”

May 27, 1980

Final crackdown operation and official end of Gwangju Uprising
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Korean Central Intelligence Agency
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Abstract
South Korea is often held up as a model for the Global South within the political science
discipline for both its economic success and democratic governance. However, in both regards,
the scope of research on South Korea is still limited by this widely accepted narrative. Current
literature on South Korea in political science has focused on its economic success as an “East
Asian Tiger” with little consideration for its political processes. Conversely, within ongoing
debates on democratization, South Korea has often been ignored in favor of other countries in the
Global South and presumed as a successful export of US democracy. As the literature stands,
there remains a dire need for research specifically on South Korea’s political formation as well
as the impacts of U.S. involvement in the context of post-1945 US hegemonic order. These
prevailing narratives on South Korea within political science lead me to ask: how did Korean
people negotiate their position as the backdrop of global power struggles? What were the
motivations for Korean people to mobilize? How did Korean people’s movements serve as a
means to reclaim agency and political recognition? To reframe South Korea around Koreans, I
focus on people’s movements using the Jeju 4.3 Struggle and the Gwangju Uprising as case
studies to better gauge evolving Korean popular opinion and its strength to mobilize the public.
Given prevailing notions of the U.S. as a beacon for democracy for South Korea, I reevaluate
this history in consideration of alternative motives for United States involvement and critical
theory to offer a fuller understanding of South Korea’s longer struggle for independence. In
doing so, I offer insight into how Korean political agency defied the Western liberal democratic
framework and in turn posed an existential challenge to US hegemony. This case-study analysis
presents a novel understanding of South Korea’s political processes and the ramifications of US
influence on nascent nation-states. By placing the people’s movements of Jeju and Gwangju in
conjunction with one another, this work seeks to illuminate the trajectory of South Korea’s
political formation and the US hegemonic context that shaped Korea and subsequent independent
nations.
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Introduction

Setting the Stage

The Korean War is often regarded as “The Forgotten War” in the American public
imagination, little more but a shadow after World War II and a brief forewarning for the
following Vietnam War. The common narrative goes that this supposed three-year blip of a war
began on June 25th, 1950 when North Koreans, alongside Chinese allies, charged through the
38th parallel and were then pushed back by US General Douglas MacArthur, leading UN forces
to a swift victory with the Armistice of July 1953 (Cumings 2005, 238; Hwang 2010, 175-178;
Hwang 2016, 1). But this story neglects to mention that an armistice does not mean an end to a
war and that the US air bombed more tonnage of bombs and napalm in Korea than the entire
Pacific Theater in World War II (Moon 2019). While the Korean War is often minimized and
relegated to the past, this retrospective understanding of Korea deeply undermines Korea’s great
importance to determining the trajectory of the world. Although the first “hot war” of the Cold
War era (M. Kim 2019, 358), critical scholar Christine Hong notes that the Korean War “has
thus outlasted the latter’s declared end elsewhere around the world,” and in doing so, “tellingly
resists linear accounts of war” (Hong 2015, 600-601). For the lives of countless Koreans
scattered across the globe, the remnants of war are intertwined in the fabric of our lives—from
where we call home to what flag we pledge (or refuse to pledge) our allegiance to. The
unimaginable horror and brutality of the Korean War has settled like sediment in the everyday,
cast aside like loose debris to continue an unending war with an inescapable “formidable, crisis-

generating, self-perpetuating, institutional architecture” (Hong 2015, 598). As concluded by
historian Monica Kim, “The Korean War is a war that is simultaneously everywhere and
nowhere. It is a war that is marked on territory and consciousness” (Kim, 360).
Re-examining how the narrative of the Korean War is told and from whose perspective is
critical to recognizing its high stakes. As noted by anthropologist Heonik Kwon, “imagining the
political future of Korea… is inseparable from locating the origin of the Korean War” because
“claiming a particular version of the origin is simultaneously an act of asserting a particular
vision of the nation’s history and future” (Kwon 2010, 2-3). In Bruce Cumings’s contestation of
the Korean War’s start date, he aptly captures this very point by shifting our frame of
understanding from one of American military force to Korean political will: “as we search
backward for that point, we slowly grope toward the truth that civil wars do not start: they come”
(Cumings, 238). The very unstable temporality and ubiquity of the Korean War defies
categorization whether understood as a civil war, a “police action,” a war of intervention, or as
noted above, the first “hot war” of the Cold War. This strategic ambiguity does not absolve us of
our responsibility to strive toward a closer version of the truth. As warned by Monica Kim, “the
US embrace of liberal warfare as a redemptive crucible is critical to how we must pay attention
to these wars of intervention” (M. Kim 2019, 358). Furthermore, the widely accepted U.S.
narrative of war in Korea has larger implications beyond the peninsula, as cultural critic Rey
Chow notes, “the United States has been conducting war on the basis of a certain kind of
knowledge production, and producing knowledge on the basis of war” (Chow 2006, 1).
The field of political science—and international relations in particular—have served as the
birthplace of this knowledge production. The very same modernization theory and procedural
definitions of democracy that have wrought mass destruction on the Korean peninsula continues
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to prevail within the discipline. Although these schools of thought have been challenged
throughout more recent years by critical scholars like Robert Vitalis and Alina Sajed, the
persisting nature of such theories as widely accepted truisms in the political science discipline
threaten to uncritically rationalize US liberal warfare and “rende[r] its forms of violence as
inevitable,” as warned by historian Monica Kim (M. Kim 2019, 359). The current landscape of
political science, and the US as a whole, in regards to Korea is best exemplified by a wall
reading “FREEDOM IS NOT FREE,” with stoic steel soldiers traversing imitations of Korean
rice paddy fields and whom “answered the call to defend a country they never knew and a people
they never met” (The Korean War Veterans Memorial Foundations, n.d.; National Park Service,
n.d.) This telling of the Korean War, as impressed into the public by the United States, is one that
belies the supposed promise of Western liberal capitalist democracy that political scientists
continue to use as the model of successful governance in theorizing about democratization and
international development. Or in other words, the US self-claimed role as a martyr on behalf of
securing “freedom” globally i.e. the spread of democracy and free trade (Persaud and Sajed
2018, 60). This narrative demands gratitude for the implied costs of American efforts to fight for
a “free” Korea, and circumvents any discussion of whose supposed freedom was fought for in
the first place or of the violence required as other than an abstract, unknowable place and people.
In the US story, Korean people—much less their histories, political will, or agency—are not
even a subject. The US telling of the story of the Korean War, and Korea at large, is embedded
with Orientalist notions that obscure the enduring legacies of colonialism and foreign occupation
that have shaped the political transformations into what has become modern Korea.
This work aims to make a critical intervention in political science by instead framing the
story with Korean people and their agency at the center and respond to the central struggle of
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Korean people’s movements since supposed independence: political recognition in the post-1945
decolonizing world. I aim to do this by tracing the evolution of Korean people’s movements and
their demands throughout the Jeju 4.3 Struggle and the Gwangju Uprising to argue that Korean
people’s movements were a struggle for political recognition in the context of post-1945 US
hegemony. By looking at this time period between Japanese surrender in 1945 and the 1997
election of Kim Dae-jung, “the most prominent symbol of opposition to military oppression”
(Jung 2003, 43), I focus on how Korean people’s movements have mobilized for political
recognition in the context of independence and international pressures whether by externally
imposed elections in Jeju and martial law in Gwangju respectively. I analyze these two events
specifically because they mark significant bookends of this period and offer insight into how
people’s movements have evolved from the stigmatized silence around Jeju 4.3 to the broadly
supported Gwangju Uprising of 1980 that catalyzed the protest movements critical to
interrupting South Korea’s succession of military dictators. Furthermore, I argue that Korean
political agency threatened US geopolitical motives by challenging US authority and asserting
self-determination outside of the democratizing model. By weaving in how US presence on the
peninsula has impacted people’s movements throughout my analysis, I offer a critical
intervention by centering Korean and Korean American sources as well as identifying how US
anti-Communism and Orientalism co-mingled to particularly dehumanize Korean people as the
subject of their own story. I will do this by lending a postcolonial reading to primary sources
both from declassified US files and Korean primary sources to offer a more complex
understanding of Korean agency and people’s movements. Lastly, I will conclude with
reflections on the implications this analysis has for future work on Korea within political science
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and major takeaways for the discipline in considering the Global South within the context of
political change and upheaval.
Though by no means a granular or all-encompassing account of Korean people’s
movements at large, this overview of the events in Jeju and Gwangju aims to offer some
perspective into events rarely discussed in the dominant political science literature on Korea and
furthermore recenter Korean people and experiences and reevaluate US involvement through a
critical lens. In writing this, however, I do not claim to be the sole authority on or have exclusive
insight to what I describe. As Dong-Choon Kim notes, “While students in Japan and the United
States were digging into Korea-related archives in libraries, their Korean counterparts were
taking to the streets to throw stones” (D. Kim 2009, iv). I lean into the complexities of entering
this academic realm as a person both in an elite American institution and part of the Korean
diaspora, and offer an analysis grounded by a rigorous literature review and informed by my
lived experiences. I name this because as William Sewell notes, “most social scientists avoid
emotion like the plague” as if acknowledging the intimately painful, emotional context will be
tainted by some “irrationality, volatility, subjectivity, and ineffability” that “their own lucidity
and scientific objectivity will be brought into question” (Sewell 2005, 238). But, as we have
discussed already, the unending and everywhere nature of the Korean War leaves an indelible
mark on all those touched by it, and I would argue like Sewell that it is “impossible to explain
without considering the emotional tone of the event” (Sewell, 239). At the heart of this thesis is
an inquiry into how did Korean people negotiate their position as the backdrop of global power
struggles? What were the motivations for Korean people to mobilize, and how did Korean
people’s movements serve as a means to reclaim agency and political recognition? It is from this

5

context that I approach this subject with humility and care in the hopes of rendering a narrative
grounded by the protest, critique, and labor of Koreans who have come before me.

Literature Review: Korea in Political Science

The Korean story as told by political science is one that largely hails South Korea as the
exemplar of the US liberal capitalist democratic project. While US liberal capitalism can be
understood more clearly from its name as the pursuit of globalization and free trade, most often
to advantage and benefit the United States, the “democratic” aspect of this project requires some
breaking down. As articulated by foundational democratization scholar Roald Dahl, democratic
theory can be understood as the study of “processes by which ordinary citizens exert a high
degree of control over leaders” (Dahl 1956, 3). But more fundamentally, Samuel Huntington best
sums the US understanding of democracy as “elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of
democracy” (Huntington 1991, 9). When put together, the US liberal capitalist democratic
project spreads a narrative of civilization being defined by supposed individual choice—whether
that be in what one buys or who one votes for—and proposes “the spread of democracy and of
free trade as approaches to preventing conflict” (Sajed 2019, 60). However, by purporting the
individual as the cornerstone of progress, this US project minimizes larger systemic injustice
while at the same time justifying its own role vis-à-vis supposedly defending freedom abroad.
Through a critical reading, the US liberal capitalist democratic project becomes an American
international export that replaces the civilizing mission instead with governance and wealth as
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markers of humanity. The dominant types of attention Korea as a subject has attracted within the
political science discipline only strengthens this reading.
Particularly, the development and democratization literature has heavily contributed to
importing this project into the political science discipline’s understanding of Korea. Lauded as an
“East Asian Tiger” or “Asian Dragon” part of the “Asian Miracle” (McCord 1989, 74; The
World Bank 1993, 1; Snyder 2018, 53), South Korea has been shrouded by Orientalist
fascination within political science research and theorization. Specifically, South Korea has
come to represent the underdog Asian challenge to the Washington Consensus of free-market
trade liberalization by implementing a strong centralized state (i.e., US-supported military
dictatorship) and export-oriented policy (Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011, 47; Haggard, Kim, and
Moon 1991, 851; Rodrik 1997, 423). Through modernization theory, US-supported military
dictatorship and the brutal violations of supposed liberties guaranteed under Western liberalism
are conveniently glossed over in the name of development and presumed democratization to
follow. In this manner, democratization and industrialization are assumed to be intrinsically
linked rather than separate processes.
While scholars trace modernization theory back to Weber’s 1906 essay, Lipset sums the
idea that democracy is linked to economic development as “the more well-to-do a nation, the
greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” in his most frequently referenced work from
1959 (Lipset 1959, 75). Building on this claim, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens
crystallize this theory through their joint 1992 book Capitalist Development and Democracy
where they argue that “there is no way of explaining this robust finding” that “a positive, though
not perfect, correlation between capitalist development and democracy must stand as an accepted
result” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 4). Curiously, both these seminal works in
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modernization theory neglect the entirety of the Asia-Pacific in their case studies, instead
focusing on other continental regions like Africa and Latin America. Despite the great attention
given to Asia’s rapid industrialization, this glaring omission of Asia’s challenges with
democratization despite some successful economic development calls into question this widely
accepted modernization narrative in political science.
However, there have been several political science scholars who have contested the
prevailing modernization theory by expanding ideas of democracy beyond the procedural
definition used by prior formative scholars Armijo et al in their 1994 article argue that they are
“inclined to believe the contrary, holding the two (democratization and economic liberalization)
to be incompatible at least under the conditions facing developing nations,” arguing that “failed
economic reforms can undermine the credibility of new democratic governments” (Armijo et al.
1994, 164). Schmitter’s 1995 essay builds on this critique as he argues that “liberalism, either as
a conception of political liberty or as a doctrine about economic policy, may have coincided in
some countries with the rise of democracy, but has never been immutably or unambiguously
linked to its practice” (Schmitter 1995, 16). With this relationship between democracy and
capitalism being questioned, Zakaria’s 1997 work attempts to refine the democratic transition
paradigm by arguing “to have democracy mean, subjectively, “a good government” renders it
analytically useless” (Zakaria 1997, 25). To address the inconsistencies and short failings of
democratization literature, Zakaria terms and juggles different definitions of democracy, arguing
that states should pursue constitutional liberalism rather than democracy in order to eventually
consolidate a liberal democracy from an illiberal one (Zakaria 1997, 40-41). In these more
contemporary challenges to the democratization and modernization literature, these scholars
offer perspective into how free-market economic industrialization does not necessarily constitute
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democratization, and how these processes might be better understood as separate undertakings
rather than some inevitable phenomenon.
While these challenges to the long-staying assumptions of modernization theory are
necessary, they too assume that liberal democracy and capitalism are the normative global
aspiration by contributing more discussion of economic development in the context of
democratization and refining ideas of democracy in the Western liberal framework of civil and
political rights. Furthermore, while these works expand on the minimal, procedural definition of
previous works, critical thinker Frantz Fanon importantly notes “The colonized subject has never
heard of such an ideal. All he has ever seen on his land is that he can be arrested, beaten, and
starved with impunity” (Fanon 2004, 9). From the elimination of ten percent of Jeju Island’s
population (H. Kim 2014, 2) or the helicopter gunship killings of Gwangju protestors (Yonhap
News Agency 2018), Korean people’s movements intimately understand the lethal irony of US
presence on the Korean peninsula. But most importantly, both these seminal works and the
burgeoning literature that aims to refine democratization processes neglect alternative visions of
a world beyond the inextricable Western liberal capitalist democratic framing embedded in
political science as a discipline.
Additionally, although academia insists on adopting a carefully “objective” or “neutral”
perspective, such a position is impossible when the discipline heavily deals with war making and
advancing global hegemony. As explained by historian David Engerman, “the Cold War was
made in and by American universities” (Engerman 2003, 92). While the advent of area studies
programs is the most salient example of the relationship between the Cold War and academia,
the foundations of the political science discipline is itself entrenched with belief systems that
reflect its legacies in power and war. As noted by critical scholar Alina Sajed, the assumption of
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an anarchical self-help system that belies both dominant realist and liberal viewpoints on
international relations “occlude the steep power differentials and hierarchies operating within the
system, and thus the very deliberate atrocious violence needed to sustain such hierarchies” (Sajed
2019, 61). In turn, the foundation of political science at large fails to seriously consider the
potential of critical theory in leading the field to a more nuanced, thoughtful understanding of
Korea and the Global South as a whole.
In his 2002 essay, Thomas Carothers incisively questions and critiques prevailing notions
of democracy, especially in reference to the assumed “third wave” of democracy. Carothers
argues that the democratic-transition paradigm is US-centric and has “buried old, deterministic,
and often culturally noxious assumptions about democracy, such as that only countries with an
American-style middle class or a heritage of Protestant individualism could become democratic”
(Carothers 2002, 8). Although Schmitter and Zakaria’s offered amendments to the existing
democratization literature address some of its shortcomings and limitations, Carothers argues
that the proliferation of new terms that aim to explain flaws in democratization theory like
‘illiberal democracy’ are missing the fundamental existential issue that “by describing countries
in the gray zone as types of democracies, analysts are in effect trying to apply the transition
paradigm to the very countries whose political evolution is calling that paradigm into question”
(Carothers 2002, 10). Although Carothers made this point two decades ago, this very point
continues to be sidestepped by the discipline in favor of human rights or new democratic
theories.
In other words, the dominant analysis of the Global South in the political science
discipline fails to seriously contend with the backdrop of colonialism that has shaped people’s
movements and their subsequent demands that operate beyond a Western liberal capitalist
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democratic framework. The concerted efforts in political science to frame Korea through solely a
democratization and or a development lens efforts sideline both the central struggle of Korean
people negotiating for independence and the essential context of the post-1945 decolonization
era. By glossing over US involvement as a positive influence and dismissing the ways the US
actively suppressed these people’s movements, Korea’s long political struggle for independence
becomes reduced to a mere victory of the US liberal capitalism democratic project. Even in
accounts that acknowledge Korea’s hardships in relation to international geopolitics, US
involvement is valorized and adopts a paternalistic tone as exemplified by the Director on KoreaU.S. policy at the Council on Foreign Relations Scott A. Snyder, “The Korean Peninsula has
historically been a victim of the tragedy of great-power politics… having had no viable choice
but to rely on the United States as an effective protector in the decades since the Korean War”
(Snyder 2018, 1). As Edward Said notes, “the modern Orientalist does not, as he believes and
even says, stand apart objectively… His Orient is not the Orient as it is, but the Orient as it has
been Orientalized” (Said 1979, 104). These key aspects are critical to understanding the
formation of South Korea and its trajectory, and to neglect this context—as the majority of the
political science literature has done thus far—jeopardizes the entire discipline’s understanding of
the post-1945 world and threatens to support further war-making and coercion in the name of
Western liberal democracy.
In line with Carothers’s suggestion that we should not impose a forthright transition
paradigm and “instead formulate a more open-ended query of ‘What is happening politically?’” I
believe an interdisciplinary approach and critical lens is deeply needed within political science. I
seek to reframe the discussion around Korea through its rich history of people’s movements with
the intention to render a fuller picture of power struggles and political suppression beyond the
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normative democratization model. Additionally, by focusing on two case studies—Jeju 4.3 and
the Gwangju Uprising—I am able to offer a deeper analysis through close readings of primary
source materials and careful literature review. By drawing from other disciplines such as History,
Sociology, and Korean Studies that are currently asking similar questions and offering critical
perspectives, I seek to amend the shortcomings I see in political science by bringing in an
interdisciplinary breadth of literature. Furthermore, given that the dominant political science
literature on Korea is permeated with deeply-embedded Orientalism, I hope to offer some
corrective by prioritizing work written by Korean and Korean American scholars and grounding
this work throughout with both Korean and US primary source materials. As social historian
Dong-Choon Kim notes, “For Koreans, who have not been the masters of their own destiny,
having been under the influence of the superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union, the
first priority should be to Koreanize the Korean War” (D. Kim 2009, 19).

Historical Context: What was the US doing in Korea?
“Southern Korea can best be described as a powder keg ready to explode at the
application of a spark.”
— Political Advisor in Korea H. Merrell Benninghoff, September 15, 1945

When Japan formally surrendered in World War II on August 15, 1945 by accepting the
Potsdam Declaration, enormous celebrations filled the streets in Korea for several days afterward
at the prospect of an independent Korea (K. Hwang 2017, 168). After decades of Japanese
colonial oppression, Korean people were drawn to “change, reform, and revolution” with leftist
groups having “widespread public support” (H. Kim 2014, 22). Furthermore, Koreans were
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quick to immediately mobilize for independence in the vacuum left by the Japanese colonial
government and restore self-governing order though a provisional organization named the
Committee for the Preparation for Korean Independence (CPKI). Soon after, over a hundred
local “people’s committees” sprung up throughout the peninsula (K. Hwang 2017, 168), and
these collective efforts would come to form a temporary national government known as the
Korean People’s Republic or People’s Republic of Korea (PRK), less than a month after
Japanese surrender (K. Hwang 2017, 168). The PRK platform consisted of five essential
elements to restructuring postwar Korea by seeking to unify different politics groups, distribute
land to current tenants with affordable prices, purge Japanese officials and collaborators from
positions of authority, extend suffrage to all, and minimize government monopoly (M. Kim
2019, 49). This clear and impassioned vision for an independent Korea crystallized this
momentous occasion and incredible feat of Korean political will to have in effect, “assumed
administrative control throughout South Korea” with over one hundred counties and over one
thousand townships represented (Heo 2021, 62).
However, these strides toward self-governance would soon mark the beginning of other
foreign powers entering the peninsula. As the Korean War Veterans Memorial ominously
forebodes, “FREEDOM IS NOT FREE” (The Korean War Veterans Memorial Foundations,
n.d.). Because the Allied forces, and not Koreans themselves, defeated Japan, Korean
independence was not a victory for the Korean people so much as a privilege the Allied Forces
had the sole authority to allocate. As historian Kyung Moon Hwang explains, “as the primary
agents of liberation, the Allied powers determined the ultimate fate of the country, which meant
that they were also the immediate agents of national partition” (K. Hwang 2017, 169). In the
days before Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender, the US set its sights on Korea after
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realizing that previous agreements with the Soviets at the Cairo Conference in 1943 would leave
the USSR with full oversight over the entire Korean peninsula (K. Hwang 2017, 169; Cumings
2005, 187). Worried that the US would not have enough influence, a split occupation instead was
proposed at the 38th parallel line which was hastily drawn up by young U.S. colonels in thirty
minutes so as to “place the capital city in the American zone” (Cumings 2005, 187). The USSR
accepted this revised proposal, and a five-year trusteeship was established at the Moscow
Conference in December 1945 (Cumings 2005, 190).
However, the US Army led by General Douglas Macarthur readily occupied southern
Korea as early as September 8, 1945 and created the USAMGIK by appointing General Hodge
as the Commanding General of USAFIK overseeing the XXIV Corps as the assigned occupation
force (United States, Hermes, and Sawyer 1962, 3-7). Established months prior to the Moscow
Conference and imposed after a mere twenty days of Korean self-governance (H. Kim 2014, 2122), the creation of USAMGIK was a direct rejection of PKR authority and Korean political
autonomy at large. In the words of General Hodge at a press conference days later, “In effect, I
am the Korean government” (The Courier-Journal 1945). After declaring itself the only
legitimate government on the peninsula, USAMGIK proceeded to outlaw any grass-roots state
building efforts and dissolve the local councils created through the PKR while retaining central
Japanese colonial police, military, and state apparatuses by staffing former colonial officials. (H.
Kim 2014, 24).
Both the Korean backlash as well as USAMGIK’s attempts to crackdown on any Korean
political dissent was intense. US occupations forces rapidly published a number of ordinances to
suppress Korean protest—notably Ordinance Number 19 in October 30, 1945 which essentially
outlawed any disagreement with the USAMGIK and Ordinance Number 72 which enumerated a
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list of “offenses against the military governments” that were punishable by death which became
“the purveyor of the “state of emergency” framed by the threat of death” (M. Kim 2019, 60-62).
While the US presented itself as “the friends and protectors of the Korean people” (M. Kim
2019, 59), the US suppression of Korean political dissent was brutal, with thousands of leftist
activities jailed and hundreds of them killed” (K. Hwang 2017, 171). With US support and
American-educated Syngman Rhee leadership, the southern Korean government “combined
various militias and paramilitary groups into a policing force that would carry out an often brutal
elimination of political opponents” (K. Hwang 2017, 171).
This crackdown on Korean political dissent reflects the greater existential stakes a noncompliant Korea posed to the US. As affirmed by a letter written by President Truman in
response to Ambassador Pauley, “I agree with you that Korea is, as you so aptly phrase it, ‘an
ideological battleground upon which our entire success in Asia may depend’” (Truman 1946).
Through the early Cold War lens, the US could not comprehend peasant political participation,
land reform, and grassroots mobilization as anything other than communism as reflected in
Ambassador Pauley’s correspondence with President Truman that misrepresented the people’s
committees as the Communist Party (Pauley 1946). In this manner, Korean efforts toward
autonomy and self-government threatened US stakes in establishing itself as the global hegemon
through the spread of liberal capitalist democracy. Under the auspices of the USAMGIK and USled UN troops, Korea became a critical site for the US to put Western liberal democracy to the
test on the global stage. In that same letter written by Ambassador Pauley, he contends “it is [in
Korea] where a test will be made of whether a democratic competitive system can be adapted to
meet the challenge of defeated feudalism, or whether some other system i.e., Communism will
become stronger” (Pauley 1946). As Hong reminds us, this kind of critical work examining
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Korea requires an “urgent inquiry into the inception of the South Korean state and the
anticommunist raison d’être that constitutes its foundations” (Hong 2015, 604).
On the other hand, Koreans continued to demonstrate against the USAMGIK in outrage
particularly with the maintained Japanese colonial apparatuses and the shock of the dissolution
of PKR. Through parades and the distribution of posters and pamphlets, Korean people
continued to extensively protest and contest USAMGIK authority through monumental mass
opposition and rebellions throughout southern Korea. In one such pamphlet written by CPKI
members titled “A Message to U.S.A Citizens,” they highlight the US’s hypocrisy by asking:
“Do you think it is possible to build a new nation in democratic way without freedom of speech,
without freedom of mass meeting, without freedom of all political activities?” (M. Kim 2019,
49) Although state-narratives often dismissed Korean political dissent as a matter of northern
Korean or Communist influence, “unimpeachable internal evidence shows that nearly all of the
dissidents and guerrillas were southerners, upset about southern policies” (Cumings 2005, 192).
The US-USSR held joint commission meetings throughout the following year in 1946
regarding the unification of Korea as per the Moscow Conference 1945 resolution, but quickly
reached a deadlock over whose model the Korean peninsula should follow (H. Kim 2014, 23).
To resolve this issue, the US turned over Korea’s fate to the UN Temporary Commission on
Korean (UNTCOK), and on February 26, 1948 the UNTCOK passed a resolution to hold a
separate UN-sponsored election in South Korea (Heo 2021, 89). The US depended on the
success of the 1948 elections in South Korea to establish global hegemonic order via its liberal
capitalist democratic project, even at the expense of dividing a country. This existential question
of Korea’s independent future and the US’s position in the world order found itself in Jeju, an
island just off the coast of southern Korea that challenged US authority.
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Jeju 4.3 Struggle
“The Koreans are the most politically minded people I have ever seen. Every
move, every word, every act is interpreted and evaluated politically.”
— General John R. Hodge, December 16, 1945

The Jeju 4.3 Struggle took place during a unique context in Korea’s history amidst Korea’s
supposed liberation from Japan, international negotiations among Allied Powers vying for power,
and the eventual division imposed onto the Korean peninsula. By critically reevaluating the Jeju
Struggle as an effort to reestablish Korean political recognition in protest of the division of Korea
and the everyday abuse endured by Jeju islanders, the Jeju Struggle illuminates both US interests
and Korean people’s movement’s continual struggle toward independence. Furthermore, the Jeju
Struggle’s assertion of Korean political agency threatened the US’s hegemonic project, and in turn
mapped how anti-Communism and orientalist notions would come to shape US’s Korean policy.

Context
Jeju Island has been a site of political contestation for centuries dating back to the
thirteenth century. Since the Mongol T’amna Kingdom invasion 57 BCE, Jeju was subsumed
into the Joseon Dynasty in the fifteenth-century before being colonized by Japan until the Pacific
War. Since undergoing the command of the United States Army Military Government in Korea
(USAMGIK) following Japanese surrender, Jeju has been used by the United States as a naval
base since Barack Obama’s “pivot policy” (S. Hwang 2016, 30-32). But prior to this most recent
occupation, Jeju has been uniquely “considered a place of strategic importance in Northeast
Asia” and throughout World War II “both Japan and the Allied Forces saw Jeju as an important
location for ensuring victory in the war” (H. Kim 2014, 27). Korean Studies professor Su-
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kyoung Hwang aptly summarizes its history and its subsequent political unrest with: “Cheju
experienced a repeated cycle of conquest, resistance, and persecution that lasted for hundreds of
years. The space of contention during the 1948 uprising was, in a sense, born out of this
historical structure” (S. Hwang 2016, 32).
Jeju’s precedent as the “historical Korean seat of unrest” is made only more evident by
the state’s prevailing narratives of Jeju as a “red island” or a “hotbed of Communism,”
characterized as a “bloody battle ground of warring ideologies” and a “cancer of the trouble in
South Korea” (S. Hwang 2016, 30). To understand Jeju, and the extent of its brutal suppression,
requires an understanding of how the question of Korea in the global sphere was one predicated
on an emerging world order where “US and Western powers were moving unevenly from the
tropes of ‘civilization’ to the markers of ‘governance’ in how they racialized the global order”
(M. Kim 2019, 47). The mere fear of Communism and any possible communists became a
blanket-justification for mass-slaughter and state-sanctioned violence of any political dissidence
as formalized with the advent of the National Security Law in 1948. Although many victims and
survivors of the Jeju 4.3 massacres do not identify themselves as communist, herein it’s
important to recognize how anti-Communism became a means to fortify U.S. orientalist logic
and support subsequent brutal suppression. Ultimately, however, a specific political
identification within a Western liberal democracy or Soviet Communist binary is not as
important as the demands and lived experiences of Korean people themselves.
The series of protests and subsequent mass killings of civilians in Jeju Island between
1948 to 1954 is called by many names, ranging from Jeju 4.3 after the widely accepted start date
on April 3rd, to Jeju April 3 Incident, Jeju 4.3. events, the Cheju Rebellion, or the Jeju Uprising
or Massacre (Heo 2021; Cumings 2005; Kim 2014; Hwang 2016; Hong 2021). For the purposes

18

of our discussion, I will offer another name, “Jeju 4.3 Struggle,” or “the Jeju Struggle,” in the
hopes of capturing the fighting spirit of Jeju protestors in the face of adversity while also
acknowledging the immense trauma embedded in the loss of tens of thousands of Jeju islanders
as well as the memories of unadulterated brutal violence still held by survivors.
In the story of Jeju, there were several incidents leading up to what is considered the
starting date of the Jeju Struggle on April 3, 1948. Following Japanese surrender, Jeju struggled
economically after American bombing raids from the Pacific War left Jeju factories shuttered
with an unemployment rate the second highest in the country by 1946 and a food shortage
compounded by USAMGIK’s failed grain policy and a cholera epidemic (Heo 2021, 77-83). But
among these extenuating factors, the police shootings on a peaceful procession in March 1, 1947
that resulted in six people dead and over a dozen others injured foreshadowed the bloodshed that
was about to be unleashed and some even argue marks the true start date of the Jeju Struggle
(Heo 2021, 120; Kim 2014, 14). March 1 is an annual commemoration of Korea’s independence
movement from 1919 under Japanese colonial rule, and so the particular significance of this day
meant to celebrate Korean pride and political will being tarnished by unjust police killings only
deepened the outrage Jeju people felt as USAMGIK indiscriminately rounded up 2,500
demonstrators instead of investigating the shooting (Cumings 2005, 220). Even after three
attempted investigations by Jeju officials, the USAMGIK Office of Special Investigations, and a
joint commission respectively, USAMGIK officials insisted that the police had acted in selfdefense which “reflect[ed] their belief that Jeju was rife with leftists” and “paved the way for the
Jeju April 3 Incident” (Heo 2021, 130). In addition, the domination of police and right-wing
youth group corruption and violence against Jeju people, mass detention and torture of students,
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the March 1 shooting, and left-wing suppression all contributed to boiling tensions on Jeju
Island. (Heo 2021, 146).
On April 3, 1948 in the early hours of the morning, Mt. Halla’s slopes became alight with
signal fires as an armed uprising launched by the SKLP Jeju Committee set out to attack offices
and homes of right-wing members and half of the police stations around the island” (Heo 2021,
150). Armed with little more than “cudgels, old hunting rifles, Japanese-style swords, bamboo
spears, and steel bars” (Heo 2021, 152), the Jeju insurgents’ defiance would mark the beginning
of unimaginable horror. The situation quickly turned grim as police raided suspected rebels
homes and the uprising quickly escalated as “USAMGIK intensified its efforts to suppress a
situation that they characterized as ‘full-scale guerilla warfare’” (Heo 2021, 167). Although
violence was briefly quelled by peace negotiations between 9th Regiment commander Kim Ikryeol and rebel commander Kim Dal-sam on April 28, 1948, USAMGIK General William F.
Dean shortly replaced commander Kim Ik-ryeol with hardliner Colonel Jin-gyeong Park in May
preceding the 1948 election (H. Kim 2014, 31). Given the increased resistance around the time of
the elections, Jeju having the lowest level of eligible voters in Korea registered at only 64.9%
and the results of two of the three electorates in Jeju were nullified due to a less than 50% voter
turnout (Heo 2021, 102-103; Kim 2014, 31), “the military launched a full-scale
counterinsurgency operation” in response to Jeju’s political dissidence throughout June and July
(H. Kim 2014, 31).
By the fall of 1948 when the separate South Korean government was instituted in August
1948, “whole villages were wiped out indiscriminately and tens of thousands of innocent
bystanders were killed,” as hundreds of captured instigators “were summarily executed by firing
squad” (Hwang 2017, 172). Counterinsurgency forces consisting of the army, navy, and police
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reorganized into a Jeju Defense Headquarters to launch a full-scale counter insurgency operation
during President Rhee’s Jeju martial law order in November. At this time, one-third of the total
Jeju population relocated and almost eighty percent of the total deaths of children and elderly
occurred as the military razed entire villages, destroyed food-supply, and encircled the rebel’s
main hideout at Mt. Halla (H. Kim 2014, 35-36). Although the active protest had more or less
ended by the second half of 1949 with a brief resurgence throughout the Korean War, Jeju
people were still cruelly treated by police and the NWYL, with the 1st Independence Battalion
summarily executing nearly 250 people with President Rhee’s approval (Heo 2021, 255). After
the US sent a final punitive campaign by a special guerilla warfare unit called the “Rainbow
Unit,” the quarantine was finally lifted on Mt. Hall by Jeju police on September 21, 1954 (Heo
2021, 265).
While the final death toll remains contested with the initial Jeju Truth Commission
estimates under 15,000 (Yang 2018, 41), the Jeju 4·3 Incident Investigation Report estimates the
number of deaths being between 25,000 and 30,000 while some accounts report the toll being as
high as 60,000 people (H. Kim 2014, 12; Cuming 2005, 221). Accepting the Jeju 4·3 Incident
Investigation Report’s estimate, that would mean one tenth of Jeju’s total population was killed.
As noted by Jeju correspondent Heo Ho-joon, “Among the civilian massacres that occurred in
various parts of the country during the period immediately following Korea’s liberation and
during the Korean War, the Jeju April 3 Incident exhibits the involvement of government and
paramilitary organizations and massacres of a type and on a scale that merit discussion in the
context of the UN Genocide Convention” (Heo 2021, 18). The magnitude of violence and
bloodshed cannot be understated, nor the long-lasting impacts such brutal suppression leaves on
the psyche. This struggle spanned throughout modern Korea’s arguably most turbulent time
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beginning before Korea’s first elections since Japanese independence to lasting beyond the
signing of the Korean War armistice. In making efforts to better understand the Jeju 4.3 Struggle
with the people at the forefront, we can begin to delineate Korean people’s agency and political
will toward a unified, independent Korea.

Characteristics and Analysis
The causes of the Jeju 4.3 Struggle have been long speculated to be connected to
dissatisfaction with the USAMGIK occupation, opposition to the south-only elections being held
1948, local Communist mobilization, and or general grievances with police abuse and foreign
occupation (S. Hwang 2016, 28). However, statements released throughout the uprising such as
the SKLP Jeju Committee’ statement and SKLP Jeju Committee member Lee Sam-ryong’s
testimony best reflect the cause behind the Jeju 4.3 Struggle. On the day of April 3, 1948, the
SKLP Jeju Committee published a statement “denouncing the establishment of a separate
government” in southern Korea and “demanding the establishment of a unified state” (Heo 2021,
150). Although two seemingly straight-forward demands, such a platform proved to be deeply
disruptive and almost offensive for the US that sought to secure its hegemonic position within
Northeast Asia via the upcoming southern Korean elections. The motives for the Jeju Struggle
were twofold: first, as a means to defend themselves from continuous US suppression and
heightening violence from police and youth groups, and second, as a political struggle toward a
unified Korea and reject the division of the peninsula (Yang 2018, 41). Protesting the south-only
Korean elections was the logical means to achieve these motives given that the elections
represented something much larger than a vote. For the US, the general May 10 elections would
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legitimize Korea as a nascent democratic project, and in turn the US’s own Western liberal
capitalist values. But for Koreans, hosting externally imposed elections for only half of the
peninsula of an undivided country was a clear example of US disregard of Korean autonomy.
The uprising then was a means for Jeju insurgents to exercise political agency though an active
rejection of US interests as well as a reassertion of political recognition for Koreans to decide the
future of Korea on their own terms. As told by SKLP Jeju Committee member Lee Sam-ryong,
“the points [SKLP] generally discussed were opposition to the separate election, unconditional
release of people under arrest, and achieving democracy… but the police and the people from the
Northwest Youth League really took things too far. So we found ourselves at a crossroads where
we could either die sitting down or die fighting” (Heo 2021, 151).
This fatalistic perspective of the Jeju protestors reflects both the extent of severe
oppression Jeju islanders experienced at the hands of local police and the NWYL, and a deeper
urgency to defend their dignity by asserting themselves as actors with agency in this time of
mass suppression. As elaborated further by Lee Sam-ryong in that same interview:
That’s how we found ourselves thinking that if we were going to die, we might as well be
standing up as sitting down. As a young person on Jeju at the time, you couldn’t very
well stand by and watch. The people from the Northwest Youth League would rape
young women—that’s something we witnessed ourselves. It’s hard to imagine they were
doing that to other Koreans. Where did that kind of bad behavior come from? So for all
those reasons, we decided to take things into our own hands. [We weren’t at all afraid of]
dying back then. We couldn’t forgive the people from the Northwest Youth League.
(Heo, 2021, 151)
The Jeju insurgents were making an active decision to “take things into [their] own
hands” because of the personal responsibility they felt to defend their fellow civilians and
reaffirm their humanity in the face of everyday abuse that devalued them otherwise. By
reckoning with the indiscriminate violence Jeju people were facing at the hands of their own
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community members working on behalf of the anti-Communist and pro-American state, the Jeju
protestors took to arms following a postcolonial logic wherein “the colonized subject discovered
reality and transforms it through his praxis, his deployment of violence and his agenda for
liberation" (Fanon 2004, 21). However, after undergoing years of suppression, torture, and abuse
by local police and rightist youth groups, the violence Jeju insurgents employed is better
understood as an act of defiance and self-defense from these conditions. In Su-kyoung Hwang’s
interviews with survivors of the Jeju Uprising, Hwang found that “compared with the police or
youth groups, the rebels were more discerning in their use of violence, limiting their targets to
the rightists and their families” (S. Hwang 2016, 38).
Although there has been an impulse to label these insurgents as communists due to them
being organized by the SKLP (H. Kim 2014, 2; Hwang 2017, 172), evidence has suggested
otherwise. Although the USAMGIK characterized the Jeju 4.3 Struggle as linked to northern
Korean communist activity, these accusations were proven false (Jeju 4•3 Peace Foundation
2018, 21). Furthermore, in a report conducted by the US military, the majority of SKLP
members lacked “any real understanding of, or desire to join the Communistic movement,” and
were characterized as largely “ignorant, uneducated farmers and fishermen whose livelihood had
been profoundly disturbed by the war and the post-war difficulties, and… were easily persuaded
that the SKLP offered them increased economic security” (S. Hwang 2016, 38). While this
alternative reading offers a less charitable perspective of the Jeju Struggle’s larger aims and
intelligence, this description from a US military report is significant considering the US tendency
to mischaracterize any form of political dissent as evidence of communism. However, regardless
of whether the Jeju insurgents could or could not be categorically described as holding a
communist political orientation, the suspicion of such leanings was justification enough for the
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full-scale crackdown and scorched-earth operations that followed. Regardless of whether the
rebels in the Jeju 4.3. uprising were definitively communist, this thesis is of the mind that
fixating on Jeju through a Cold War “anti-communist or communist” lens undermines the
complexity of political thought and vision of people’s movements on the ground.
More interestingly, the Jeju rebels’ demands and language reflect a more critical
postcolonial politics aimed at fighting for Korean self-determination. As observed by General
Hodge on his arrival to Korea, “the word pro-American is being added to pro-Jap, national
traitor, and Jap collaborator” (Macarthur 1945). Indeed, when looking at the messages spread by
Jeju insurgents, they called on Koreans to join them in a greater fight for Korean political
recognition and independence. In a statement published by the SKLP in the local press, the
insurgents directly address their attackers: “Dear Defense Forces soldiers and policemen. Take a
look at your rifle. Do you know where that gun comes from? That gun came from the taxes we
paid with our sweat and blood. Do not turn your gun toward your parents, brothers, sisters who
have stood up in this heroic struggle” (Go 2020; my translation). By using such intimate
language in referencing family members to their very own ‘sweat and blood,’ Jeju insurgents
invoke a kinship with the soldiers and policemen by connecting their struggles as Koreans who
have yet to experience a reunified independent Korea. This only becomes more apparent as the
statement continues with:
“So don’t let your precious blood spill for nothing! So for the sake of driving out the
American invaders from our native land! For the sake of overthrowing the traitor
Syngman Rhee! For the reunification of the motherland, for the independence and
freedom of the people… Join us together in this struggle to protect our country, our
family, our parents, our siblings.” (Go 2020; my translation).
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This appeal to Korean soldiers and policemen reflects a greater motive of Jeju insurgents
beyond their own mistreatment at the hands of local authorities. Had the Jeju insurgents been
driven merely by grievances with police and rightist groups, appealing to them would make little
logical sense if the goal were to simply oust those who were responsible for local abuse alone.
This call to join the rebels suggests that the Jeju insurgents had at least some level of awareness
that the Korean Constabulary was working under the command of the USAMGIK, even as the
US insisted on an ‘invisible hand’ role in “organizing all operational plans and implementing
them by means of the Constabulary” (Heo 2021, 161). Although a more skeptical perspective
may dismiss the SKLP Jeju Committee statement as an inflammatory piece of propaganda, the
language being used by Jeju insurgents offers an incredible insight into their perspective on
Korea’s conditions and their role within it. Through this publication, Jeju insurgents reframed the
conflict from a fight between rightist police and dissident Jeju civilians to a greater existential
struggle for Korean people living under US occupation of the Korean peninsula. By invoking the
Jeju 4.3 Struggle’s cause to be for "the reunification of the motherland, for the independence and
freedom of the people” (Go 2020), Jeju insurgents situated their uprising into a larger struggle
for political agency over the future of Korean independence and self-determination. This
message to the perpetrators of violence that they are actively resisting illuminates the fight for
Korean agency and political recognition as the driving force for Jeju’s popular uprising.
Jeju insurgents’ resistance to externally imposed elections and vision of a unified, selfdetermining Korea directly challenged the US’s authority and geopolitical interests in southern
Korea. However, as mentioned earlier above, such an effort did not go punished. Although the
armed Jeju resistance groups were numbered at three-hundred-twenty people, the Jeju 4•3 Peace
Foundation reminds us that “[the military and police] sacrificed 30,000 people” (Heo 2021, 151;
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Jeju 4•3 Peace Foundation 2018, 32). Tellingly, in all individual cases, state agents like the
police, military, and NWY were responsible for almost 85 percent of the harm as compared to
around 12 percent of the insurgents” (H. Kim 2014; 13-14). Although there were peace
negotiations as early as two weeks after the initial uprising—with Constabulary officers
regarding rebel units as “brothers” with a “burning spirit” and “indominable desire for autonomy,
unification, and independence” (Heo 2021, 169)—the critical popular appeal of Jeju insurgents’
platform was too great of a threat to American objectives in Korea. When 9th Regiment
Commander Kim Ik-ryeol returned with the peace agreement to the USAMGIK, General
William F. Dean threw it out and “continued the suppression campaign to ensure the
establishment of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948” (S. Hwang 2016, 29). Following
USAMGIK’s rejection of the peace agreement, the Constabulary launched a retaliatory campaign
under USAFIK command and USAMGIK’s operational plan for the US military to suppress the
rebels indirectly through the Constabulary and ensure the success of the May 10 elections (Heo
2021, 155-158). Although the Jeju 4•3 Peace Foundation notes that “if these agreements had
only been implemented, the April 3rd Massacre would not have happened” (Jeju 4•3 Peace
Foundation 2018, 22), US objectives in establishing a separate ROK government were a greater
priority than the Korean people themselves who would live with the longstanding consequences
and traumas of the Jeju 4.3 Struggle.

Implications
Understanding how such a mass-scale atrocity like the Jeju 4.3 Struggle could occur
begins with understanding how military forces did not see this enormous loss of life as real
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human lives or a loss at all. Or in other words, understanding the Jeju 4.3 Struggles requires an
analysis of how the US occupation rendered Jeju people, and Koreans generally, as inhuman.
Beginning with the March 1, 1947 police shooting as one of many examples, the police
gunfire of thirty-eight bullets into a peaceful procession of Jeju people signified a particularly
enraging instance of Jeju people’s lives relegated as disposable and not human. In an uninspired
response to allegations of police beatings and torture, chief civil affairs officer Thurman A. Stout
acknowledged such behavior as “undemocratic” without taking any action to stop such abuse
(Heo 2021, 144). Although the US purported to occupy Korea in order to secure its democracy,
the disconnect between how the US presented itself and the lived experiences of Jeju people on
the ground reflects a larger attitude of the US’s occupation in Korea. Particularly, officer Stout’s
lack of regard for the violence enacted on Jeju civilians demonstrates how anti-Communism
directly shaped US treatment of Koreans. In the third investigation into the March 1 shooting
incident, it was declared without any evidence that “the incident on Jeju Island occurred because
of a scheme to overthrow the American military government and throw our society into chaos in
collusion with North Korean forces” (Heo 2021, 123). By not only linking Jeju people to North
Korea because of state-perpetrated rumors of Jeju and North Korean collusion, but to justify
police killings of Jeju people at-will because of said correlation rationalizes Jeju people as void
of their humanity because of a supposed proximity to communism. Anti-communism then was
used as a convenient US tool to mark anyone who challenged US authority as communist and
justify the state’s subsequent sanctioning of mass-scale violence. As theorized by Franz Fanon,
“the "native" is declared impervious to ethics, representing not only the absence of values but
also the negation of values... in other words, absolute evil" (Fanon 2004, 6). Applied to the
context of Jeju 4.3 and Jeju people, the US’s hardline anti-Communist stance enabled the US to
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suspect any form of dissent as communism, and therefore create an enemy reasonable to kill. By
categorizing people in this way, the US saw Jeju islanders as “the colonized subject… always
presumed guilty" (Fanon 2004, 16), and the subsequent tens of thousands of people “who had
been slaughtered were merely “Reds” in the [US government’s] eyes” (Heo 2021, 266).
Furthermore, the US’s anti-Communism dovetailed with its Orientalization of Korean
people. As remarked by a Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) agent, “[Koreans] were not trained
in any skills and that included the art of governing themselves. A very few were able to function
at all if someone were not telling them what to do and how to do it” (M. Kim 2019, 67). By
infantilizing Korean people as incapable of agency or self-governance, the US comfortably
placed itself as the steward of Korea’s future. General Douglas Macarthur remarked on the status
of Korea in 1945 with, “by occidental standards Koreans are not ready for independence” and
waved off Koreans’ impatience with the trusteeship because “I am told there are no Korean
words expressing “in due course” (MacArthur, 1945). Rather than considering possible Korean
dissatisfaction with continued foreign occupation, General Hodge casts Korean people as smallminded ‘orientals’ who cannot comprehend their own situation. By positioning the US as the
occident and Korea as the orient, the US crafts an orientalist narrative that heralds itself as
“rational, virtuous, mature” in contrast to the “irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike” Korean
‘orientals’ (Said 1979, 40), and thus justify US control in Korea because Koreans are presumed
too infantile to do so themselves. As characterized by US Political Advisor to Korea Langdon,
Korea was “a small defenseless nation in a troubled postwar world” (Langdon, 1947) in need of
protecting. This US-constructed narrative as a self-described benevolent sovereign in order to
justify “[US] occupation policies of insuring all freedom and maintaining property rights and
order among liberated oriental people” (MacArthur, 1945). Through this racialized and
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orientalist viewpoint, the US typified a kind of respectable, ‘liberated’ oriental that fell in line
with US interests and could only logically be grateful for the US as a “nation whose long
heritage of democracy has fostered a kindly feeling for peoples less fortunate” (M. Kim 2019,
44), as described by General Hodge in leaflets distributed to Koreans before US military arrival
in 1945. However, the US’s benevolent sovereign character quickly unraveled when Jeju people
dared to fight for political recognition and challenge US authority over the future of an
independent Korea.
The May 10, 1948 elections were not just any elections for either Koreans or the United
States. As noted by researcher Heo Ho-joon, “the successful staging of the May 10 election was
the sole focus of the UAMGIK’s attention” (Heo 2021, 160). For the US, the south-only
elections would be the critical moment to mark the success of the Western liberal capitalist
democratic project as well as solidify the US’s hegemonic order in the world. Although the US
heralded itself as supporting Korean independence, the US actively dismissed Korean input or
political will as US political advisor Langdon writes, “The Korean people must know and
recognize facts as they exist and should not follow the will-of-the-wisp of purely wishful
thinking” (Langdon, 1947). The US desire to influence Korea into a model of its own accord was
established early on as Ambassador Pauley noted to President Truman, “The United States
should carry out a propaganda and educational campaign within Korea in order to sell democracy
and the four freedoms” (Pauley, 1946), with President Truman replying in kind, the importance
of “our policy of winning Korean support for our concept of democracy” (Truman, 1946).
Had the US had genuine interests in supporting the self-determination of Korean people,
why would the US need to a propaganda campaign to ‘sell’ specifically ‘our concept’ of
democracy? Could such a claim be genuine at all if the elections, a hallmark of US liberal
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democracy, were not instigated by the Korean people themselves? As noted earlier in the history
of US involvement in Korea, the creation of the May 10, 1948 elections came out of a deadlock
in the US-USSR’s joint commission talks on the future of Korea. It was only by turning to the
UN just established a few years earlier that the south-only elections in Korea were approved.
Other than Syngman Rhee’s input, an American-educated Korean prized by the US for his
“endearing use of the democratic symbolism that stirs American hearts” (Cumings 2005, 213),
Koreans were not consulted in this decision. Because Korea was not being a formally recognized
nation-state, and therefore not able to theoretically represent itself at the UN or even a reliable
American diplomat representative of their demands, Korean people and Korea itself was not
politically recognized.
In looking at Korea, we can begin to understand how “the civilizing mission impulse of
FDR, the League of Nations, and trusteeship was soon to be reconstituted via the antiCommunist mission of the Truman Doctrine, the United Nations, and the national security state”
(M. Kim 2019, 54-55). If, as Edward Said describes in his conception of Orientalism,
“Orientalism responded more to the culture that produced it than to its putative object, which was
also produced by the West” (Said 1979, 22), the US produced an idea of Korea and Korean
people as a defenseless, incapable Orient that needed the guiding hand of the US’s liberal
capitalist democratic project and US protection from the Communist danger of the USSR.
However, this narrative was two-fold. Once Koreans like the Jeju insurgents expressed dissent
and sought to establish their own autonomy and vision of Korea, the US’s anti-Communist logic
rationalized merciless suppression. Through this hardline anti-Communist lens, Koreans
rejecting US authority then forfeited their right to life as a less-than-human Communist oriental.
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But as the Jeju 4.3 Struggle illuminates, the US’s brutal suppression campaign of Jeju
people’s political will reflects how the concomitant forces of anti-Communism and Orientalism
embedded in the US perspective had little discernment over whose lives paid the cost of its
objectives. As Monica Kim remarks in her research, “The US Army, the villagers told me, could
not recognize the difference between Koreans” (M. Kim 2019, 351). Through understanding the
Jeju 4.3 Struggle from the perspective of Jeju protestors and a critical eye to US involvement, we
can begin to understand the existential crisis of South Korea itself and uncover the Korean
struggle for political recognition in the face of mounting US suppression as well as the
consequences of the US liberal capitalist democratic project in Korea. Having been long
stigmatized for its association with communism which was later disproved, returning to the Jeju
4.3 Struggle gives us invaluable insight into Korean political will and Korea’s future trajectory.

Gwangju Uprising

“우리들은 정의파다 좋다 좋다
We are seeking justice, it’s good, it’s good

같이 죽고 같이 산다 좋다 좋다
To live together and die together is good, is good

무릎을 끓고 사느니보다 서서 죽기를 원하다
I’d rather die standing than live on my knees

우리들은 정의파다”
We are seeking justice
— Protest chant from an undated leaflet, May 1980 (my translation)
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The Gwangju Uprising has left an indelible mark on the history of South Korean people’s
movements for rallying people from all walks of life and establishing a cultural shift in how
Koreans were taking action to fight against the military government. By reviewing the
movement’s evolving leadership and demonstrators’ testimony, the Gwangju Uprising reveals
how everyday civilians united around human dignity and political recognition amidst mass
violent suppression. Furthermore, the US support of the military government marked a
significant shift as the larger Korean consciousness began to question the US’s role in Korea.

Context
The Gwangju Uprising was a ten-day long struggle between civilians and the South
Korean military in the city of Gwangju from May 18 to May 29, 1980. The events that transpired
are officially recognized as the “May 18 democratization movement,” but the Gwangju Uprising
can be best understood as an outburst borne out of the culmination of political crises and popular
dissent in Korea from 1979 to 1980. As summed by sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, “the
assassination of President Park Chung Hee by the chief of the Korean CIA… a subsequent
military coup led by General Chun Doo Hwan… and democratic struggles the following spring
were intimately related to the uprising” (Shin 2003, xii).
The rapid turn of events preceding the Gwangju Uprising was greatly informed by the
political turmoil that took place throughout Korea in the decade before. Korea’s political context
throughout the 1970’s was shaped by President Park Chung Hee who acted as both “the symbol
and agent of… militarization regimentation over civic engagement” and “material growth over
political liberalization” (K. Hwang 2017, 196). In other words, under Park’s rule, Korean society
was geared toward economic development and militarization in its allyship with the US at the
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expense of Korean political freedom. By the time of his assassination, Park Chung Hee reigned
over South Korea for eighteen-years due to him, yet again, amending the constitution under
martial law in October of 1972 which “prohibited political dissent and in effect, rendered him to
be president for life” (K. Hwang 2017, 204). The Gwangju Uprising was in large part the
outgrowth of immense political struggle throughout 1979 following the “YH incident” in August
where textile workers protested massive layoffs and the “Pu-Ma struggle” in October where tens
of thousands of people protested Park Chung Hee’s autocratic Yusin system (Shin 2003, xiii). In
October 1979, Park Chung Hee was assassinated by the head of the Korean CIA which gave way
to a military coup led by ROKA’s Defense Security Commander Chun Doo Hwan and general
Roh Tae Woo by December 12, 1979 (K. Hwang 2017, 228).
By spring of 1980, Korea was flooded with protests especially across most college
campuses. The widespread backlash to the military regime amassed into a gathering of 150,000
participants at Seoul station on May 15 to demand the resignation of Chun as well as immediate
democratic reform in the form of direct presidential elections. (Shin 2003, xiv). With this popular
support, protest leaders were hopeful that the government would end martial law if given more
time and decided to suspend actions that were scheduled in the following days (Katsiaficas
2006). Instead, de-facto leader General Chun Doo Hwan extended the martial law already ineffect to the entirety of South Korea which suspended the Cabinet, closed the National
Assembly, and shut down all university campuses (Shin 2003, xiv). At midnight on May 18
when martial law went into full-effect, military regime personnel and police cracked down on
those who had protested by raiding activists’ homes and arresting a number of opposition
leaders, including Kim Dae-jung who had run against Park Chung Hee in the 1971 elections (Na
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2001, 479; Katsiaficas 2006). On top of this, multiple battalions of the Special Warfare
Command (SWC) were sent to Chonnam National University (Choi 2006, xiii).
The following morning on May 18 would mark the widely accepted start date of the
Gwangju Uprising as hundreds of students began to gather at Chonnam National University’s
main front gate and host a sit-in while chanting expressions like “Martial Law Troops Go Away”
and “Chun Doo Hwan Must Go!” (Shin 2003, xv). Although university protests were typical
during this time, the elite paratroopers sent by the military to occupy the main universities were
not as the soldiers responded with “an unprecedented brutality” with the “indiscriminate murder
of students, women, children” and had them mercilessly “beaten, clubbed, knifed, and
bayoneted” (Na 2001, 479; Cumings 2005, 382; Shin 2003, xv). The next morning, the number
grew to thousands of students who regrouped to demonstrate and, again, were met with extreme
violence from the martial law troops. Eleventh Brigade soldiers searched nearby buildings and
homes and took any young man into custody, forcing captured citizens to strip down to their
underwear to be beaten in the street (Shin 2003, xv-xvi). This abject display of horrific cruelty
incensed ordinary citizens, who were previously uninvolved, to join the fold and fight back
against the soldiers (Shin 2003, xv-xvi).
By the next day, the whole city rose up in support of the students and numbered in the
tens of thousands. The martial law troops, now outnumbered, used increasing violence against
demonstrators and open fired into the crowd which killed or seriously injured at least twenty
people (Shin 2003, xvi). The uprising intensified as the general public only fought back harder
with “stones, bats, knives, pipes, iron bars and hammers” (Katsiaficas 2006), and ignored the
curfew to occupy police stations and City Hall, stage vehicle-demonstrations, and set fire to
broadcasting stations who failed to report on the military’s violent suppression (Na 2001, 479).
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The next day, military troops did not follow-through on their promise to withdraw by March 21
at noon, leading to hundreds of thousands of people marching to the Provincial Office where the
military army was headquartered (Na 2001, 480). When the demonstrators arrived, the troops
executed a mass shooting in broad daylight, killing at least fifty-four people and injuring five
hundred which indelibly quashed hopes for a peaceful resolution (Shin 2003, xvi). Overwhelmed
by the sheer number of protestors, the military troops retreated from the city at around 5 p.m. and
by evening, citizens were under direct control of the city of Gwangju and established an
autonomous self-governing commune for the next five days (Na 2001, 480). The significance of
this turning point cannot be understated, as legal scholar In-sup Han notes, “it was the first
victory for citizens against the army in modern Korean history” (Han 2003, 1001).
From March 22, “communal order was established with almost no disturbances, violence,
plunder or crime” as newly formed civilian committees organized groups to clean up the streets,
support families with funerals, run a blood drive for those wounded, offer subsidies to lowincome citizens, and distribute voluntary food donations as well as created self-defense units and
patrols in preparation for the military’s counter-attack (Na 2001, 480). Throughout the five-day
period of self-rule, the commune maintained civil order with the broad public support of
Gwangju citizens, but the commune leadership began to splinter as internal disputes grew over
whether to accept the government’s demand for the unconditional return of all weapons or to
continue to fight until all civilian demands were met (Shin 2003, xvii). After an impassioned
vote on March 24 during the commune’s daily rally, those who advocated for resistance won by
a slight majority (Katsiaficas 2006). However, by March 26, troops in military tanks began to reenter Gwangju. Although the demonstration leaders managed to successful block military access
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with a “March of Death,” the people’s resistance was ultimately overpowered by dawn of March
27 in a final battle where over a hundred protestors fought to the death (Na 2001, 481).
Over four decades have passed since the Gwangju Uprising, and there remains no
universally agreed upon total death toll. Although the Martial Law Command officially reported
170 deaths, scholars have argued that these numbers “were grossly understated” (Han, 2003,
1002), with some arguing (as many as 2,000 people” were killed (Katsiaficas 2006). Best
estimates today suggest that “about five hundred civilians” were killed and “over three thousand”
were injured (Shin 2003, xvii). But regardless of the true total of civilians who were killed or
injured, the Gwangju Uprising stands as a testament to the profound political will of Korean
people’s movements and resistance to brutal military suppression. The Gwangju Uprising is best
understood by turning to the people at the heart of this movement, and how their motivations and
resistance paved the way to overhaul the military government and actualize Korean selfdetermination.

Characteristics and Analysis
The Gwangju Uprising at its peak amassed over a hundred thousand demonstrators, and
to reduce what started out as any other student protest that grew into a city-wide uprising into a
singular cause would be an impossible task. However, by looking at documents and testimony
from Gwangju protestors as well as the committees and citizens’ rallies that formed throughout
the uprising, a fuller picture is rendered of South Korean people’s movements and how the
people on the ground “create its meaning through common interpretations during a struggle”
(Choi 2006, 93).
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The onset of the Gwangju Uprising, however, can be clearly connected to South Korea’s
political climate—namely the nationwide student demonstrations that had already been occurring
in protest of the illegal military seizure of power under Chun Doo Hwan’s de-facto leadership
and the following martial law imposed on the entirety of South Korea. But the turning point of
the Gwangju Uprising, wherein the rest of the city joined the student protestors against the
military paratroopers, can be understood by a written testimony of an unnamed worker
representative:
I have watched many citizens and students mercilessly killed in front of me,
but all the broadcasts and newspapers reported that there was not even a single
casualty. How can the institutions that are supposed to work for our people do
such unconscionable things? (“To the patriotic citizens of Gwangju” 1980, my
translation).
This testimony offers insight into how the outgrowth of popular resistance was rooted in
a deep outrage of being denied their humanity, particularly from the institutions meant to serve
them. International relations scholar Jungwoon Choi notes that descriptions among witnesses
consistently described protestors as being treated as less than human by the military troops, and
that “the Gwangju’s citizens’ rage was not only the resentment of those who had been treated
with unjust violence, but also a rational fury over the destruction of human dignity” (Choi 2006,
106). Furthermore, as reflected across different disciplines, the general consensus among
different Korean scholars points to the unprecedented military violence against students on May
19, particularly of students being stripped and beaten out on the street by paratroopers, as a
critical motivating factor for everyday Gwangju civilians to participate in the protests (Na 2001,
47; Shin 2003, xv; Choi 2006, 96-97). This drive to join the demonstration is deepened further
through the context of Gwangju civilians understanding the military crackdown on protesters as
not only an affront to human life and young people, but also an attack on Gwangju’s future. As
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described by Choi, “Middle-aged and older generations of Gwangju citizens actively supported
the demonstrations because they felt a serious sense of crisis over the community’s future,”
adding that many citizens understood students as “the future of Gwangju” and “believed that the
least they could do was to support them” (Choi 2006, 96-97). From the perspective of the
protestors, the military government’s brutal crackdown of Gwangju civilians was not just cruel
and unjust behavior, but an attack by the state on their human dignity, their futures, and right to
life. Thus, the impetus for the Gwangju Uprising was a reassertion of their political will and
agency as everyday people in the face of mass suppression.
Another critical source of insight are the main committees that took form throughout the
uprising: the Citizens’ Army, the Citizens’ Settlement Committee (CSC), the Student Settlement
Committee (SSC), and the eventual Citizen-Student Struggle Committee (CSSC). The Citizens’
Army was formed on May 21 in response to the military troop’s mass shooting of protestors
(Ahn 2003, 11), as demonstrators took up arms ranging from sticks to self-made Molotov
cocktails with the help of Hwasun miners who lent dynamite and detonators, and civilians who
obtained guns dating back to World War II by raiding local police stations (Ahn 2003, 13;
Katsiaficas 2003). The Citizens’ Settlement Committee (CSC) was created the next day by the
local government who called in local influential leaders consisting of “priests, lawyers,
government officials, and business leaders” to come up with a list of demands and negotiate with
the Martial Law Army (Choi 2006, 170; Shin 2003, xvi). Notably, the CSC was comprised of “a
number of conservative personages who had earlier stood against social movements” (Na 2003,
184). The seven demands made by the committee, which were criticized for being “rather
passive and defensive” (Jung 2003, 253), were as follows:
1. Martial law forces shall not be mobilized before negotiations are
concluded.
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2. All those arrested during the uprising shall be released.
3. The government will officially acknowledge the military’s excessive use of
violence.
4. A guarantee of no retaliation after the settlement.
5. No charges will be brought against the people for their actions during the
uprising.
6. The families of the dead will be compensated.
7. The protestors will put down their arms if these demands are satisfied.
(Shin 2003, xvi).
Ironically, at the same time of the negotiations, a citizens’ rally was being held where
banners and posters read phrases like “Withdraw the Martial Law!”, “Release the Restrained!”,
“Release Kim Dae-jung!”, and “Filthy Murderer Chun Doo Hwan, Step Down!” (Jung 2003,
253; Jung 2003 10). Although the Gwangju Uprising was catalyzed by outrage against the
military’s blatant disregard of human life as well as dissent against the martial law in place and
Chun Doo Hwan’s illegal seizure of power, the majority of the CSC’s demands do not mention
the above nor challenge the legitimacy of Chun Doo Hwan’s military seizure. Instead, the listed
demands prioritized ending further loss of life and preventing protestors from being punished
which, while important, did not reflect the rallying cries and demands being made. When
demonstrators were told the results of CSC’s negotiations—which were premised on the
unconditional return of civilians’ weapons to the Martial Law Command—the crowd grew angry
and turned against the CSC (Shin 2003, xvii; Choi 2006, 174-175). The Student Settlement
Committee (SSC) was formed when “students got furious” upon learning their initial demands at
the rally were not being met, and “demanded that the commanding post be replaced by university
students” (Na 2003, 183). As exemplified by one impassioned Chosun University student Kim
Jong Bae who grabbed the mic in response to the CSC, “Hey! You bastards who want to rise in
the world by selling Gwangju citizens’ blood! We don’t need you! Go away, all of you!” (Choi
2006, 174-175). The popular frustration with these negotiations and the CSC illuminates how
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protestors were not simply looking for recompense for the killed civilians, but were seeking a
larger idea of justice that consisted of an upheaval of military suppression and a reclamation of
their humanity and political will.
Although the SSC became a critical group to bridge the CSC and the Citizens’ Army
(Choi 2006, 180) to coordinate essential needs for the larger populace, some members of the
Citizen’s Army opposed compromise with the military command as well as student leadership
during the creation of the SSC given that many students “had disappeared from the frontline at
the time of the armed struggle” (Na 2003, 183). While students and activists provided leadership
for the Citizens’ Army, “young workers constituted the core of the Citizens’ Army” with over
sixty percent of those arrested from the Citizens’ Army members being factory workers and the
fighters on the frontline largely consisting of seventeen- and eighteen-year-old boys who held
occupations like “newspaper delivery boy, shoeshiner, waiter, factory worker, and peddler” (Ahn
2003, 19). Although students had ignited the uprising and espoused the initial demands to end
martial law and overturn Chun Doo Hwan’s leadership in favor of direct presidential elections,
there was a clear disproportionate number of losses for young worker demonstrators who made
up the majority of deaths and the brunt of state violence as defenders on the frontline. When it
came to the question of whether to collect and return weapons that embroiled the leadership with
tension, or the Citizens’ Army, the question of returning their weapons were unconscionable as
they “hoped to spark a nationwide uprising to overthrow the dictatorship—and they were willing
to die trying to restore democracy in one fell swoop” (Katsiaficas 2003). For those in the
Citizens’ Army, their weapons served as a tool for self-determination and a political
demonstration of their agency in the face of mass state violence. Even until towards the end of
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the uprising on May 26, the Citizens’ Army offered these words upon learning of the Martial
Law troops re-entering the city:
Of course, we will lose. We might die. But, for us to throw the guns away and
receive the Martial Law Army without any resistance—the cost was too much
after the last several days of our struggle. To complete the citizens’ resistance,
somebody should stay here at the Provincial Hall, and defend it to the end.
(Jung 2003, 256).
Although the Citizen’s Army has drawn more popular support in the years since and is
now valorized in the public imagination as having “symbolized the Kwangju citizens’ fight for
social justice,” (Ahn 2003, 12), it is worth noting the considerable number of protestors who
were willing to concede their arms to the Martial Law Command to secure the negotiated
demands. Political scientist Na Kahn-chaek, who analyzed the groups that formed through the
Gwangju Uprising, observed a notable discrepancy of opinion regarding disarmament that was
correlated to the protestors’ experience with social movements. While those who had
participated in social movements prior to the Gwangju Uprising opposed the collection of
weapons, those who had not—which constituted the majority of the SSC—were in favor of
returning their arms and continuing “relatively moderate and institutional activities” (Na 2003,
185). Furthermore, for other influential local leaders who foresaw the near end of the Gwangju
Uprising “in the face of the superior firepower of the government,” they supported disarming
civilians in hopes of preventing further losses and managed to collect and return about half of
civilians’ firearms (Jung 2003, 254). However, it is worth noting that this argument grew less
favorable “as the Martial Law Army was continuing to kill civilians, these terms were rather
meaningless” (Jung 2003, 254). In this vein, while there were protestors who resonated with the
Citizens’ Army, for many others, the civilians’ weapons were understood as a means for selfdefense that were a necessary concession to the Martial Law troops in order to prevent further
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conflict. Although some protestors were coerced by the settlement committees who “exploited
their class weaknesses” (Choi 2006, 194), to write off the significant number of returned arms as
well as the intense citizens’ rally that resulted in a small majority who favored turning in their
weapons (Katsiaficas 2003) would be dismissive of the protestors who wanted a peaceful
resolution after the uprising’s initial fervor.
Ultimately, after an impassioned citizens’ rally made up of over 100,000 people on May
24, a coalition of those who had advocated resistance rather than surrender their weapons took
over leadership to form the ‘Citizen-Student Struggle Committee’ or CSSC (Na 2001, 481;
Katsiaficas 2003). Given that citizens’ rallies, which were held every day between May 22 and
26, were “the sole and most effective form of direct democracy through which the citizens could
come to wide-ranging agreements on their right to life and democracy” (Jung 2003, 255), this
shift in leadership and its popular support is critical in understanding the meaning the Gwangju
Uprising took on for those participating. Through this active consolidation of people’s input and
leadership, this people’s movement evolved in accordance with the will of the protestors to
honor the human dignity of those who had fallen as well as their own, and their demands for
political recognition through a government chosen by the people. The formation of these groups
reflects the popular nature of the Gwangju Uprising which rallied people from all walks of life,
but the conflict between these groups is also indicative of the ways that status, class-background,
and prior movement experience were embedded in competing visions for what justice and a
liberated Gwangju looked like. In particular, “the struggle to restore order versus the fight to
recover honor” (Choi 2006, 181) in the aftermath of ongoing brutal mass suppression and a
greater “struggle for truth” (Jung 2003, 258) in the pursuit of a liberated Korea.
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Having established the natural progression of the Gwangju Uprising on the ground, the
distortions of the people’s movement by the ROK military leadership and the US bear
discussion. At the onset of the uprising on May 18, the ROK government was quick to seize the
narrative of the Gwangju Uprising with interim-President Choi Kyu-Ha declaring “North Korean
communists’ espionage against our nation is causing social chaos. These spies have deeply
infiltrated our society and are encouraging and praising the recent campus disturbances… In this
very critical time, some irresponsible and unpatriotic politicians, students and workers are
threatening national security… Our nation is in very serious danger” (Shin 2003, xviii). This
statement exemplifies how any challenge to ROK’s military government was immediately
conflated with communist motivations as a means to delegitimize and antagonize any political
dissent. By framing the protestors as communists and agents of North Korea, this justification
enabled the brutal crackdown that followed after Chun Doo-hwan sent elite paratroopers known
as “Black Berets” that were specially trained to fight North Korean warfare (Shin 2003 xx).
Furthermore, while the ROK government characterized the Gwangju Uprising as a national
security issue as a rhetorical strategy to induce support from the larger Korean populace, this is
an admission in of itself of the ways the Gwangju Uprising called into question the illegitimate
foundations of ROK’s military government.
Although the ROK’s accusations of North Korean spies were proven to be baseless by the
first civilian government administration under Kim Young (Shin 2003, xviii), US
correspondence on ROK leading up to and throughout the Gwangju Uprising continually stressed
North Korean relations and the ways protestors supposedly impeded the ROK’s nonexistent
efforts toward political liberalization. As described by US Ambassador to Korea William H.
Gleysteen in a report to the Secretary of State, the US government was concerned with how the
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military responded to protestors on May 17 would “seriously increase the danger of North
Korean intervention,” and would “erase what little credibility the Choi government has
concerning its political liberalization program” (Gleysteen 1980). Even as the US began to
prepare military support to ROK, Gleysteen writes again in May 21 “augmentations might be
possible if we become increasingly concerned about the potential for North Korean exploitation”
and must “avoid any formal actions which might be provocative and lead to an escalation with
North Korea.” (Gleysteen 1980). Through the most generous reading of these documents, one
could argue that the US was genuinely worried that any political tumult in South Korea could
trigger North Korean forces to invade in support of those who opposed the ROK government.
However, given that Gwangju sits on the opposite outward edge of the Korean peninsula from
North Korea as well as the complete lack of evidence of any North Korean spies in the student
demonstrations, this fear of a North Korean threat was not logical or well-founded. Additionally,
the US conflating of Korean protestors with a North Korean threat displays how the US refused
to recognize Korean political dissent against the ROK government as legitimate even under
effective military dictatorship.
Furthermore, as protestors called into question the US’s involvement in the Gwangju
Uprising after initially hoping for US support in their efforts, the US distorted its role in
Gwangju by minimizing their involvement in its military suppression. Although the US did not
deny its involvement, as US Ambassador to Korea James R. Lilley insisted years after in 1988,
“we believe that our involvement was not significant” and the US “really didn't discover what
actually happened until the worst of the violence was already over” (Lilley 1988, 2). However,
on May 21 when arguably the worst of the violence that occurred, the Commander of the ROKUS Combined Forces Command (CFC) General Wickham “agreed to a high internal alert status
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against infiltration” and had “taken some measures associated with DEFCON 3” and suggested
possibly needing more defense troops to be sent by the US (Gleysteen 1980). This supposed ‘not
significant’ US involvement is further discounted by the US Department of Defense releasing the
20th Division as well as several aircrafts to Korea and two divisions of ROKA troops from the
US-South Korean CFC for use in suppressing the Gwangju Uprising to retake the city (Jung
2003, 252; Shorrock and and Kim, 2020). The ambivalent stance the US took throughout the
Gwangju Uprising is indicative of how Korean political autonomy was repeatedly delegitimized
through US-supported ROK military governments.
By centering the people in the Gwangju Uprising and their driving motives, the state
narratives of the protests by both the ROK and US begin to unravel. The Gwangju Uprising, as
understood by the demonstrators, reveals how Koreans consolidated their collective political
power to stand in the face of a repressive military government. While their efforts were
continually undermined by “psychological warfare and propaganda techniques used by the
Martial Law Army” (Jung 2003, 244) as well as unimaginable state violence, revisiting the
Gwangju Uprising on the terms of the people is critical to understanding their collective struggle
to restore their human dignity and political agency within Korean people’s movements as whole.

Implications
While the Gwangju Uprising officially lasted ten days, political scientist Na Kahn-chae
notes that the Gwangju Uprising was monumental in that it “affected all the other democratic
movements in Korea since 1980” (Na 2001, 478). This is particularly important given that the
Gwangju Uprising took place within the context of a domestic military illegal seizure of power
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as compared to the Jeju 4.3 Struggle, and the Gwangju Uprising was the critical event that
propelled people’s movements afterward to finally establish South Korea’s first civilian
government. The Gwangju Uprising then represents the culmination of Korea’s decades long
struggle for political recognition in the pursuit of independence and self-governance since South
Korea’s formation.
One of the Gwangju Uprising’s critical contributions is serving as the turning point for
how “Anti-Americanism became a new form of nationalism that fueled Korea’s march for
democracy” (Shin 2003, xxv). While many protesters and activists had initially sought the US as
an ally to support their democratic struggle, the deployment of CFC and US Defense troops in
support of Chun Doo Hwan’s suppressive military government was a great source of
disillusionment for protestors (Shorrock and Kim 2020). Former Peace Corps volunteer David
Bollinger offered this insight: “the citizens of Gwangju felt completely betrayed by the US
government and believed that US statements about human rights only extended to the right kind
of people and not to them” (Shorrock and Kim 2020). By dissenting against a military
government the US endorsed, the demonstrators of the Gwangju Uprising were not the ‘right
kind of people’ privy to those human rights, and their humanity was explained away by the US
and ROK with long-held anti-Communist strife and concerns over South Korea’s national
security. Notably however, while political dissidents were still conflated with North Korea and
communism, the US language around Korea had now shifted toward notions of national security,
as “there was no discussion whatsoever about what the people of Gwangju had suffered. Instead,
the entire discussion revolved around security” (Shorrock and Kim 2020). By using less
inflammatory language, the same effective military suppression became sanitized and
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subsequently rationalized as a necessary step toward establishing order or security at the expense
of Korean political will,
One of the principal struggles then for Gwangju protestors was a struggle toward truth, as
argued by Jung Keun-sik, that reckoned with the state’s full-scale violence against civilians and
Gwangju citizen’s humanity and was not obscured by these prevailing state narratives (Jung
2003). This burgeoning anti-American sentiment challenged the US’s long self-made role as
Korea’s benevolent sovereign, and made Koreans confront the US’s long history and deep
connections to the ROK state. Student Mun Pu-sik captured this critical perspective in a letter
from 1982 explaining why they set fire to the US Cultural Center in Busan with:
Just looking at the Kwangju uprising, we must ask how it is that the U.S gave
final power to Chun Doo Hwan, slaughterer of innocent lambs, for his
barbarous campaign against the citizens of Kwangju. Even a three-year-old
child knows that, based on the Korean American Defense Pact, all mobilization
rights for our army are under the jurisdiction of the Commander of U.S. Forces
in South Korea. All generations in this land are aware of the atrocity in our
history, whereby these rights were given to Korean forces to kill patriotic
citizens calling for democracy and freedom and front-line troops were sent in
to kill citizens of Kwangju. In the tragedy at Kwangju, the U.S. played the role
of mother-in-law to the murdering demon Chun Doo Hwan, thus allowing him
to accomplish his aims. (Shin 2003, xxiv-xxv).
This excerpt can be extrapolated to describe more broadly how Koreans were
recontextualizing the US now as a complacent superpower and the revelation that the US’s
tenuous relationship with Korea functionally suppressed the popular demands of Korean people
as experienced in the Gwangju Uprising.
US documents and government correspondence were also revealing of how the US
approached Korea and the Gwangju Uprising with a paternalistic tone by both insisting on
political liberalization and dismissing students and the military government alike in Korea.
Regarding Korea’s military action against student protestors, Ambassador Gleysteen writes that
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the US was “doubly disturbed that these actions were taken without any advance notification to
the USG” (Gleysteen 1980). Rather than a straightforward outcry against suppressing protesters,
the US was ‘doubly disturbed’ by the ROK government not deferring to US authority or
consulting them before making that decision. Furthermore, students and Korea’s military
government alike were infantilized by the US, as continued in the same report, “just as the
students did earlier this week, the military have now taken the law into their own hands, ignored
legitimate channels, and once again cut the USG out of the information net, and thrown down the
gauntlet to would be trouble makers” (Gleysteen 1980). In this instance, both students and the
Korean military were equated to one other through language that described them as if they were
misbehaving children who were throwing a temper tantrum with Koreans having ‘taken the law
into their own hands’ and ‘ignored legitimate channels.’ The question that bears asking then is: if
the law nor the legitimate channels did not belong in Korean hands according to the US, who did
it belong to? Curiously, although the US extended support to South Korea’s government on the
premise it would undergo “political reconciliation and constitutional change” (Carter 1980), the
US’s correspondence on Korea was indicative of a general dismissal of South Korean authority
as little more than a formality. In this manner, the US narrative suffered from a cognitive
dissonance regarding its involvement with Gwangju by portraying the US as both a disavowing
spectator and a paternalistic overseer of South Korea.
The Gwangju Uprising defied these orientalist presumptions by reasserting everyday
civilians as agents of change and political will in the larger fight for an independent South Korea.
In the context of Chun Doo-hwan’s illegal reign, independence in South Korea became a fight
against the oppressive military government and for the restoration of Korean political agency and
humanity dignity. In the time the paratroopers retreated from the city, protestors created a self-
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governing ‘absolute community’ by establishing channels for resource sharing and uniting
around their collective grief and determination to restore the honor of those who had been lost to
brutal military suppression (Choi 2006). This display of political consolidation and autonomy
demonstrated the will of Korean people to govern themselves outside of militarized enforcement.
Additionally, in an impassioned statement on May 23, the Citizen’s Army asked, “Ladies and
gentleman, who is the real rioter? Is it the martial troops, who committed brutal and ruthless
cruelty, or the Citizens’ Army who protected this city?” (Jung 2003, 16). Through this line of
questioning, the Citizens’ Army called attention to the ways the military government was
enacting mass state-sanctioned violence and perpetrating false narratives of political dissent.
Furthermore, by characterizing the military troops as ‘the real rioter,’ the Citizens’ Army
challenged the military government’s legitimacy and relegated authority back to the
demonstrators who sought a just, directly elected Korea that recognized their human dignity.
Ultimately, the Gwangju Uprising represented the popular outgrowth of Korean people
from all walks of life challenging the legitimacy of Korea’s long line of military governments.
By asserting Korean people’s humanity during ruthless suppression, the fight for an independent
Korea by Gwangju protestors defied the US’s standard framework of democratization and
instead consisted of self-determination for the people which challenged the ROK state and US’s
presence in Korea. Additionally, by analyzing the US’s inconsistent stance throughout the
uprising, the Gwangju Uprising reflects how the US struggled to contend with its own
hypocrisies regarding democratization and how Koreans became disillusioned with the US
liberal capitalist democratic project.
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Conclusion

Through closely reviewing the Jeju 4.3 Struggle and the Gwangju Uprising, normative
understandings of South Korea through a democratization, development, and modernization
begin to fall apart. While the political science literature has largely overlooked the role and
impact of Korean people’s movements on modern South Korea, these case studies demonstrate
how Korean people’s movements throughout the period between post-1945 Japanese surrender
to Korea’s first civilian government were connected by a through line of affirming Korean
human dignity and a larger continual struggle for political recognition and self-determination in
the US hegemonic order. Koreans’ pursuit of agency and autonomy did not conform neatly to the
US’s geopolitical interests in establishing South Korea as an export of Western liberal
democracy, and in doing so threatened the legitimacy of US involvement in Korea. From defying
the southern-only elections and the division of Korea in the case of the Jeju Struggle to
protesting the martial law and the US-supported military government in the Gwangju Uprising,
both people’s movements contested the oppressive conditions placed upon them and
consequently faced brutal retaliation and mass suppression as a result. However, the Jeju
Struggle and the Gwangju Uprising have since become pillars within Korean movement history
denoting both the tragic loss of life in the pursuit of Korean political will and the larger struggle
toward an independent and democratic South Korea.
Furthermore, South Korean people’s movements transcended its borders as the Gwangju
Uprising had international ramifications and “clarified how the Cold War system in East Asia
and the post-Cold War world order contributed to South Korean authoritarianism” as well as
“garnered respect and interest from progressive movements in Southeast Asia” (Jung 2003, 47).
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Although the Jeju Uprising was initially stigmatized and intimidated into silence, the Gwangju
Uprising and the movements that followed have paved the way for a wider-accepted critique of
the US’s hegemonic position within the global order. In a letter to US Ambassador Gleysteen,
the families of those imprisoned during the Gwangju Uprising wrote,
How long will the US continue to support such a horrible authoritarian
government that has no respect for human rights? …Are you going to repeat
the same mistakes that you have made in many other countries, including Iran,
where you have tasted bitter failure? Are you going to sit and do nothing while
the same mistake is about to be made in Korea? (Shin 2003, xxiv).

By invoking Iran’s political turmoil, Korean protestors demonstrated knowledge in how
the struggles of Korean people’s movements connected to other decolonizing nations globally.
Even further, Koreans recognized the US endorsement of such oppressive governments as part of
the larger trend in US’s discrepancy between its words and actions regarding democratization.
Although some critics may dismiss South Korea as small, irrelevant country or just one
case-study, the Korean peninsula has held enormous global ramifications as the first testing
ground of US hegemonic order and post-1945 global restructuring. The formation of South
Korea and the US suppression of the Jeju Struggle and the Gwangju Uprising became the
blueprint for the US in following interventions abroad from Vietnam to the Philippines. Paying
close attention to South Korea in relation to its people’s movements and history of US
involvement offers insight into how the US hegemonic order impacted nascent nation-states
globally and the potential of critical theory to offer a fuller perspective that accounts for
decolonization, race, and orientalism.
The dismissal of the Korean War as the ‘forgotten war’ is more of a retrospective issue of
political memory. But by revisiting the historical context of South Korea’s global significance as
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a connecting thread between other nascent nation-states who have undergone similar patterns of
foreign intervention, South Korea becomes a portal into understanding the landscape of
contemporary US liberal warfare and the language of ‘national security’ with regard to military
action abroad. Historian Monica Kim forewarns, “the narrative of unending war, constant threat,
and pervasive suspicion pushes the war of intervention forward as the only possible logical act”
(M. Kim 2019, 359). By breaking down the cause, motives, and characteristics of South Korean
people’s movements as well as US involvement, this work offers one way for political scientists
to begin identifying the normative thinking embedded in the literature on Korea and the Global
South at large.
This case-study analysis of the Jeju 4.3 Struggle and the Gwangju Uprising in
conjunction presents novel insight into how South Korea’s struggles for political recognition
remained largely consistent across the span of three decades throughout US and ROK military
government occupation respectively. In the face of everyday normalized violence whether by
local police and rightist groups in Jeju 1947 or the military government in Gwangju 1980,
defending the humanity and dignity of Korean life and reasserting political agency in oppressive
conditions became a radical act of resistance. By tracing the US’s shifting stance in Korea in
tandem with these people’s movements, this work finds that the US position reflected their
geopolitical motives by responding to South Korean people’s movements using a language of
anti-Communism to a matter of ‘national security.’ Through this change in language, the US
seamlessly condensed several logical leaps that political dissent could possibly be communist
and therefore be considered a national security threat. Now that matters of national security are
ubiquitous in present-day political science, particularly in the realm of international relations,
this concept begs further scrutiny into who is excluded, who is favored, and its application in the
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real world. Most importantly however, the foundational assumptions of political science require
greater scrutiny in consideration of political processes, nascent state development, and the Global
South at large. By dismissing the utility of critical theory, the political science literature
continues to discount the insidious roles larger structures of oppression permeate and inform the
power dynamics played out globally.
Although this analysis is limited by the evaluation of two people’s movements, this work
serves as an example of what future political science scholarship could look like through more
critical qualitative studies that center and frame the analysis through the people impacted.
Furthermore, while this work was limited by the author’s proficiency in the Korean language,
future studies that incorporate intentional translation work to capture the subtleties and nuance in
tone, especially in languages that do not use the Roman alphabet, are in dire need to elevate
writings, interviews, testimony, and so on from those directly impacted by this subject.
Regarding the cited sources largely being from other Korean scholars, this was both
subconsciously intentional to uplift scholars with greater proximity and knowledge on the subject
as well as reflective of the dominant political science discipline’s little interest in critically
analyzing South Korea through its people’s movements.
Ultimately, through a rigorous literature review and close analysis of primary documents
across both Korean and US archives, this work followed the evolution of Korea’s unsteady
trajectory toward independence and the impeding forces of US hegemonic order, international
geopolitical interests, and horrific suppression of any and all political dissent. From the Jeju
islanders who took up arms in the early morning to fight against the division of Korea to the
Gwangju civilians who donated their own blood to fellow demonstrators, the Jeju Struggle and
Gwangju Uprising are remarkable sites of struggle in the ways they actualized the collective

54

power that is borne from people’s movements. By understanding these people’s movements on
their own terms—as people first—Korea can offer insight into the humanity behind popular
struggle in the US hegemonic order, and a bridge to connect the personal to the political in
understanding the power in writing a narrative especially within the political science discipline.
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Appendix A: Korean Primary Sources
Figure A1: Original SKLP Statement published secretly by the editor of the Jeju Shinbo on
October 24th, 1948 retrieved from Jeju Headline next to my own English translation.
친애하는 국방군 장병과 경찰관 여러분!
총구를 보십시오.
그 총이 어디서 나온 것인가를, 그 총은
우리의 고혈을 쥐어짜낸 세금으로 산
것입니다.
영웅적인 항쟁에 떨쳐 일어선 여러분의
부모, 형제, 자매들에게 그 총구를 돌려서
안 됩니다. 소중한 총과 탄환을 동포를
향해 함부로 쏴서는 안 됩니다.
여러분의 부모, 형제와 여러분들을
지켜주어야 할 그 총을 싸우고 있는

Dear Defense Forces soldiers and policemen.
Take a look at your rifle.
Do you know where that gun comes from?
That gun came from the taxes we paid with
our sweat and blood.
Do not turn your gun toward your parents,
brothers, sisters who have stood up in this
heroic struggle. Don’t carelessly fire your
precious gun and bullets at your fellow
compatriots.
Protect your parents, your siblings, and return
your gun to the people fighting to protect you.
All the islanders (of Jeju) trust you deeply
from their hearts.

인민들에게 돌려주십시오.
모든 도민은 당신들을 마음으로부터 깊이
신뢰하고 있습니다.
당신들의 귀한 피를 보람 없이 흘리지
않도록!
미국 침략자를 조국강토에서 몰아내기
위해서도!
매국노 이승만 도당을 타도하기 위해서도!

조국의 통일과 민족의 독립과 자유를
위해서도!

So don’t let your precious blood spill for
nothing!
So for the sake of driving out the American
invaders from our native land!
For the sake of overthrowing the traitor
Syngman Rhee!
For the reunification of the motherland, for
the independence and freedom of the people!
Please point your guns at those bastards.
Please stand on the side of (Jeju) islanders,
and firmly resist the command and power of
the US forces.
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여러분들은 총구를 놈들에게 향해
주십시오.

Join us together in this struggle to protect our
country, our family, our parents, our siblings.
Dear people!

여러분들은 미국군과 앞잡이 권력의
명령을 단호히 거부하고 도민의 편에

Be an army of the people that protects the
interest of the people at any time!

서주십시오.
우리나라, 우리가족, 우리부모, 우리형제를
지켜줄 항쟁의 전열에 함께 하십시오.
친애하는 여러분!
언제 어떠한 때에도 인민의 이익을 지키는
인민의 군대가 되어 주십시오!
Source: Yung-cheol Go. 2020. “‘4.3 Whirlpool’ Kim Ho-jin, editor-in-chief of Jeju Shinbo, was
executed.” April 29, 2020. http://www.headlinejeju.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=415732.

Figure A2: “The work we must do as democratic citizens,” an undated announcement likely
made during the commune’s daily rallies from May 1980 with different protest chants.
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Source: “The work we must do as democratic citizens.” 1980. General Collection of the
Gwangju Democratization Movement, vol. 2. Gwangju Metropolitan Government Commission
on the Compilation of May 18 Historical Materials.
https://www.518archives.go.kr/books/ebook/2/index.html#page=38
Figure A3: “To the patriotic citizens of Gwangju,” a testimony written by an unnamed worker
representative addressed to other demonstrators in May 23, 1980.
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Source: “To the patriotic citizens of Gwangju.” 1980. General Collection of the Gwangju
Democratization Movement, vol. 2. Gwangju Metropolitan Government Commission on the
Compilation of May 18 Historical Materials.
https://www.518archives.go.kr/books/ebook/2/index.html#page=46
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Figure A4: A leadership map of the Citizen-Student Struggle Committee created by Na Kahnchae in “Collective Action and Organization in the Gwangju Uprising” (2003).

Source: Na, Kahn-chae. 2003. “Collective Action and Organization in the Gwangju Uprising*.”
New Political Science 25, no. 2 (June 2003): 177. doi:10.1080/07393140307196.
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Appendix B: US Primary Sources
Figure B1: President Truman’s letter to Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley on July 16, 1946.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN TO AMBASSADOR EDWIN W. PAULEY, AT PARIS
SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1946.
MY DEAR MR. PAULEY: I have given further consideration to your informative letter of June 22, 1946, on
the Korean situation. I agree with you that Korea is, as you so aptly phrase it, “an ideological battleground upon
which our entire success in Asia may depend”. Korea has been for many decades the focus of international
rivalries and I consider one of the principal objectives of our policy there to be to prevent Korea from again
becoming the source of future conflict.
Your recommendations, it seems to me, fall into two general categories—those calling for efforts on our part to
persuade the Soviet Union to comply with the Moscow Agreement and those calling for action within Korea.
While I agree that we should continue our efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to comply with the spirit and
terms of the Moscow Agreement of last December, I believe that the most effective way to meet the situation
in Korea is to intensify and persevere in our present efforts to build up a self-governing and democratic Korea,
neither subservient to nor menacing any power.
You will be glad to learn that we are incorporating into our revised policy for Korea most of your
recommendations for specific action there. We intend to carry on an informational and educational campaign to
sell to the Koreans our form of democracy and for this purpose to send American teachers to Korea and Korean
students and teachers to this country. I also hope that a considerable number of Korean engineers can be
trained here and that American engineers can go to Korea to assist in the rebuilding of its industries.
In reference to your recommendations regarding the use of Japanese reparations for the industrial revival of
Korea, your suggestion [Page 714]that the United States assign some of its share of Japanese industrial
equipment to Korea appeals to me more than your suggestion that we attempt to obtain an agreement, against
probable opposition by some of the Allied Powers, to the principle that Korea has a right to share in Japanese
reparations. In reference to your suggestion of participation of private American capital in Korea, I question the
advisability of such action prior to the establishment of a Korean Government, except on a restricted and
carefully controlled basis.
Some of the other points in our present policy which will interest you are:
1.

Broadening the basis for Korean participation in the administration of south Korea by holding elections
for key local and provincial posts and by creating a legislative assembly, in part elective, to replace the
present Representative Democratic Council. Obviously, we cannot set up a separate government for
south Korea, but the creation of a more representative consultative body may make it easier for us to
negotiate in the future with the Soviets for the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government.

2.

Assisting the Koreans in establishing a free and revitalized educational system.

3.

Assisting the Koreans in establishing a strong independent economy which will provide as high a
standard of living and as great economic security as their resources and technological development
would permit.

4. Assisting the Koreans in initiating a broad program of economic reform.
The furtherance of our policy of winning Korean support for our concept of democracy and for our program of
action within Korea can be effective in facilitating agreement with the Soviets. By making possible the
formulation and execution of liberal reforms such as land redistribution and the nationalization of certain
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industries, which are desired by a majority of Koreans, this policy should also help to broaden the basis for an
understanding with the Russians.
Our commitments for the establishment of an independent Korea require that we stay in Korea long enough to
see the job through and that we have adequate personnel and sufficient funds to do a good job. I am, therefore,
requesting the agencies concerned to see that means are found to insure that General Hodge has the men and
funds he needs to attain our objectives.
Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Source: Truman, Harry. 1946. “President Truman to Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley, at Paris.”
Foreign Relations of the United States 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII. Document 528.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d528.

Figure B2: A letter written by Ambassador Pauley in 1946 to President Truman on his special
mission to the Far East.

AMBASSADOR EDWIN W. PAULEY TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN
TOKYO , June 22, 1946.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Following are some observations, conclusions, and my staff in Korea. I have also
given consideration to interviews with people in our Occupation Forces in Korea as well as Koreans and
members of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Northern Korea.
Frankly, I am greatly concerned with our position in Korea and believe it is not receiving the attention and
consideration it should. While Korea is a small country, and in terms of our total military strength is a small
responsibility, it is an ideological battleground upon which our entire success in Asia may depend. It is here
where a test will be made of whether a democratic competitive system can be adapted to meet the challenge of
defeated feudalism, or whether some other system i.e., Communism will become stronger.
It is clear from the actions of the Soviets that they have no immediate intention of withdrawing from Korea for
the following reasons:
1. They apparently are stalling on taking any joint action with the United States toward setting up a Trusteeship,
toward forming anything resembling a provisional government, or doing anything that might in any way hamper
their entrenching themselves more firmly in Northern Korea.
2. They are propagandizing and promoting a Communist Party and a Soviet type of program which would
establish loyalty to Moscow as the highest form of loyalty to Korea. To this end they are riding rough-shod over
all political factions which might oppose or even question such a philosophy. For example, the streets of
Northern [Page 707]Korea are decorated with Soviet propaganda posters. Most of these posters publicize the
Soviet Government, and include large pictures of Stalin and Lenin.
Many of the posters read as follows:
“Long live the friendship of the Soviet Union and Korea”
“The Soviet Government is the highest form of Democracy”
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“We will raise the honor of the Red Army still higher”
“For the Fatherland, for the party, for Stalin”
“Long live Stalin, the creator of our victories”
“In a strange land a fighter must be more observant and on guard”
“The first teacher of a Red Army soldier is his Sergeant”
From the above, it is clear that the Soviet Government does not intend to allow the United States exclusive use
of the word “democracy”. “Democracy” means one thing to the Soviets, and quite another to the United States.
To us it means, among other things, freedom of speech, assembly, and press. The Soviet interpretation of
“democracy” is expressed in terms of the welfare of the masses.
In considering the effect of Soviet propaganda on the Koreans, it must be remembered that about 70% of the
present 27,000,000 people in Korea are small farmers and fishermen. Only a few have ever voted or even have
the right to vote. They have little knowledge of national or international economic affairs, and are easily swayed
by golden tongues and promises.
3. Communism in Korea could get off to a better start than practically anywhere else in the world. The Japanese
owned the railroads, all of the public utilities including power and light, as well as all of the major industries and
natural resources. Therefore, if these are suddenly found to be owned by “The People’s Committee” (The
Communist Party), they will have acquired them without any struggle of any kind or any work in developing
them. This is one of the reasons why the United States should not waive its title or claim to Japanese external
assets located in Korea until a democratic (capitalistic) form of government is assured.
4. The Soviets are taking no substantial amount of capital equipment from Korea, although they may be taking
certain stocks and products of current production.
5. They are devoting considerable effort to rejuvenate economic activity in Northern Korea probably directed
toward replacing the broken economic ties to Japan with new economic ties to the U.S.S.R.
The Soviet Army is obviously ensconcing itself for a long stay. Officers’ families are already with them. The Army
is virtually operating the railroads. Statements by high ranking Officers show no indication of any plan of leaving
or even a hope of leaving.
The possible Soviet objectives in Korea are as follows:
1.

To provide Korea as a ‘puppet state’ which would make possible a defense in depth in the event that
the Soviet Union were attacked from the Southeast. I would anticipate the present Soviet thinking
would be to deal with Korea as they did with Poland and Yugoslavia, namely, with a ‘puppet’
government they will make a Sovietized trade treaty which will only exploit the Koreans.

2.

To provide an encirclement, or one jaw of a pincer against North China and Manchuria (the industrial
heart of a strong new China). The other jaw of the pincer would be Outer Mongolia (newly Sovietized)
and Siberia.

3.

To provide a similar encirclement or jaw of a pincer against Japan in the event that Japan were built up
by some foreign power to use as a base against the U.S.S.R. The other jaw of the pincer would be the
Vladivostok peninsula, Karafuto, and the Kurile Islands.

4.

To secure favorable port concessions in the warm water ports of Ch’ongjin (Seishin) and Hungnam
(Konan) and Wonsan; similar to the concessions in the ports of Port Arthur and Dairen.
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Note: If civil war continues in Manchuria, the U.S.S.R. might occupy Manchuria on the theory that they
must protect their interest in the railroads and be able to communicate between Siberia, Port Arthur,
and Dairen.

Recommendations:
1.

The Soviet Union should be compelled to comply with the Moscow Declaration on Korea. Specifically
she should be called to task for failure to participate in the formation of a representative provisional
government, and for maintaining the split at the 38th Parallel.
Acting may be secured in several ways including:
a. Raising the issue with the United Nations or the Big Four.
b. By the United States taking action to withhold concessions which otherwise might be made to
the U.S.S.R.
c. By aggressively pursuing a campaign of propaganda in favor of a United Korea which would
make the Soviet obstructionism obvious to the Koreans and to the world.

2.

The United States should carry on a propaganda and educational campaign within Korea in order to sell
democracy and the four freedoms. It should teach the responsibilities as well as the advantages of
democracy.
In the absence of such a campaign, the Koreans will hear pretty largely only of Communism which the
Soviets preach as the highest form of democracy. Sending American teachers to Korea and Korean
students to the United States would aid such a campaign and should [Page 709]be encouraged from a
long range viewpoint. However, no immediate benefits can accrue in time to meet the present crisis.

3.

Korea should receive certain needed industrial equipment from Japan as part of reparations removals.
Her industrial economy presently is developed for the production of raw and semi-finished materials
which were required by Japan. She now requires equipment such as machine tools in order to devote
the products of her present industry to the needs of her internal economy. This can be provided in one
or more ways including:
a. Substantiating a claim for damage and cost of Japanese occupation and aggression.
b. The United States subordinating a portion of its (and possibly other countries also) claim to
Korea with or without receiving compensation from the Koreans in the form of future
deliveries of raw materials. Since this may have to take the form of disposing of United States
property, an act of Congress similar to the Tydings Act 24 on the Philippines may be required.
c. A more practical manner of bringing this about would be for the United States Representative
at the Japanese Reparations Meetings to pick the psychological time to reduce its demands
sufficiently to give Korea what it needs. (Note: The United States would not actually be giving
up anything it expects to get or even wants).

4.

The United States should give greater technical assistance to Korea in the reconstruction of her
industrial economy. This can be done by:
a. Sending engineers to Korea to aid in starting operations and training Korean supervisory
personnel.
b. Encouraging Korea to invite participation of American capital which would bring with it
managerial knowhow.
c. Encourage training of Korean engineers in American industries and engineering schools, and
send American teachers to Korean engineering schools.

You will note that the observations, recommendations, and conclusions contained herein depart from strictly
reparations or even economic aspects of the Korean situation. However, the economy of which the reparations
question is an integral part is so interwoven with the political and international phases that I took the liberty of
extending my remarks into these fields. I do not do so with any intent of usurping anyone elses prerogatives.
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I am addressing an identical original of this letter to the Honorable James F. Byrnes, The Secretary of State.
Respectfully,

EDWIN W. PAULEY

Source: Pauley, Edwin. 1946. “Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley to President Truman.” Foreign
Relations of the United States 1946, The Far East, Volume VIII. Document 525.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d525.

Figure B3: A Commanding General USAFIK Report sent by General Douglas Macarthur to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 16, 1945.

GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR TO THE JOIN CHIEFS OF
STAFF
TOKYO , 16 December, 1945.
CA 56096. I invite attention to the following report made by the Commanding General USAFIK. This message
embodies the reiteration [Page 1145]of certain facts and recommendations which have been previously
submitted. The situation demands positive action as nothing could be worse than to allow it to drift to an
ultimate crisis.
[“]Subject: Conditions in Korea.
After 3 months in occupation of south Korea I have reached the following definite conclusions. These are
considered a further crystallization of previous reports.
A. The dual occupation of Korea with Russia north and US south of the 38th degree parallel imposes an
impossible condition upon our occupation missions of establishing sound economy and preparing
Korea for future independence. In South Korea the US [is] blamed for the partition and [there] is
growing resentment against all Americans in the area including passive resistance to constructive
efforts we make here. No explanation can reach through to the people since it is counteracted by the
existing facts. Every day of drifting under this situation makes our position in Korea more untenable
and decreases our waning popularity and our effectiveness to be of service. The word pro-American is
being added to pro-Jap, national traitor, and Jap collaborator. The only advantage of the Russian
presence is to absorb a portion of the people’s resentment against the partition of Korea. Every Korean
knows full well that under the dual occupation any talk of real freedom and independence is purely
academic. It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, ever to accomplish unity spirit in the Koreans
until they see the present 38th parallel barrier removed. Every day of delay fosters further and
permanent division of the people.
B.

The Koreans want their independence more than any one thing and want it now. This stems from the
Allied promise of freedom and independence which is well known by every Korean without the
qualifying phrase “in due course”. I am told there are no Korean words expressing “in due course”. The
general uncertainty and thwarted hopes of Korean masses after the initial occupation are growing
toward certainty and hopelessness that the Allied powers were not sincere in their promise. By
occidental standards Koreans are not ready for independence, but it grows daily more apparent that
their capacity for self-government will not greatly improve with time under current conditions.
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C.

The situation in the South Korea makes extremely fertile ground for establishment of Communism. In
my opinion Koreans do not want Communism, but the unsettled conditions, the lack of clear cut
policies for the future and lack of hope for early national sovereignty by the peoples may easily push
those in US zone to radical leftism, if not raw Communism. There is currently a flow of Manchurian and
Chinese trained Korean Communists to south of 38th degree [Page 1146]who are giving active
assistance to Communistic elements already present. Cho Man Sik, a great Korean democratic leader
operating north of the 38th degrees, assures me through intermediaries that Communism will be no
problem there—that the people are cured by Russian occupation. He warns, however, that we must be
careful south of 38th degrees if we do not want to encourage it. The approximate international
influences and our occupation policies of insuring all freedom and maintaining property rights and
order among liberated oriental people favor Communistic activities. Under these policies conservative
groups tend to obey laws and ordinances while the radicals do not. The latter operate largely
underground using terroristic or coercive measures, and their activities are almost impossible to stem
with the untrained civil police and the small occupational force available with its extremely low
effectiveness due to current disintegration through the discharge system now in effect.

D. The Koreans are the most politically minded people I have ever seen. Every move, every word, every
act is interpreted and evaluated politically. A letter recently intercepted by censors seems to crystallize
Korean psychology. A Korean north of 38th degrees told of typically reported Russian actions there but
concluded that conditions are not too bad because the Russians in area didn’t interfere with his
politics. There is little hope of any real coalition of political parties here until the 38th degree barrier is
broken physically and politically and plans for final clear policies can be announced to the people in
simple terms, including times and dates, and without a lot of contingencies.
E.

Early establishment of firm and far-reaching policy of reparations and final disposal of former Japanese
property is absolutely essential. Our inability to give more than vague evasive answers to all questions
pertaining thereto is operating against our success in the occupation and is fostering radicalism,
Communism, and direct action to get something for nothing on the part of [Korean radicals. With
introduction of?] definite policies it is believed there will be a definite improvement of political and
economic conditions as well as great decrease in agitation.

F.

In the minds of all Koreans, “Trusteeship” hangs over them as a sword of Damocles. If it is imposed
now or at any future time it is believed possible that the Korean people will actually and physically
revolt.

G. The Russian methods of occupation north of the 38th degree are not understandable to Americans.
There is evidence that they have constructed and maintain an effective field works system of defense
against invasion just north of 38 degree. It is certain that they [Page 1147]have constructed and
constantly man with armed guards a line of road blocks facing south with weapons emplaced to fire
south exactly across the line they interpret from their maps as the 38th degree parallel. Actually parts
of this line are 1,000 to 1,200 yards south of the line shown by US maps. Although outwardly friendly
relations between troops of the two nations exist, persistent reports come from the north that
Russians repeatedly speak of war with US. There are also rumors south of 38 degree that US and Russia
are preparing for war. Under current conditions, border incidents of a dangerous character could easily
occur. Russian Consulate is maintained in Seoul with large staff with no legitimate reasons. The Consul
General and ranking members of his staff are making increasingly frequent trips across the
occupational boundary and are conferring with local Koreans. Despite the Russian border control, there
is a daily flow southward of 5,000 to 6,000 destitute refugees, both Japs and Koreans, giving strong
indication that the control valve is open for southward movement of undesirables. Koreans well know
that the Russians have a force locally of about 4 to 1 to Americans and with the usual oriental slant are
willing to do homage and are doing homage to the man with the largest weapon. On the part of the
masses there is an increasing tendency to look to Russia for the future.
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H. In summary, the U.S. occupation of Korea under present condition and policies is surely drifting to the
edge of a political-economic abyss from which it can never be retrieved with any credit to United States
prestige in the Far East. Positive action on the international level or the seizure of complete initiative in
South Korea by the U.S. in the very near future is absolutely essential to stop this drift. Specifically and
urgently needed are:
1. Clarification and removal of 38th degree barrier so as to unify Korea.
2. Clear-cut statement abandoning “Trusteeship”.
3. Positive statement of policy regarding status of former Japanese property in Korea and reparations
as applied to any such property.
4. Reiteration of Allied promise of Korean independence accompanying foregoing acts.
5. Establish complete separation of Korea from Japan in the minds of the press, the public, the State
and War Depts and Allied Nations.
Under present conditions with no corrective action forthcoming I would go so far as to recommend we give
serious consideration to an agreement with Russia that both the U.S. and Russia withdraw forces [Page
1148]from Korea simultaneously and leave Korea to its own devices and an inevitable internal upheaval for its
self purification.
This report is being supplemented by a report from Langdon.”61

MACARTHUR

Source: Macarthur, Douglas. 1945. “General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.” Foreign Relations of the United States 1945, The Far East, Volume VI. Document 841.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v06/d841.

Figure B4: Letter from The Acting Political Adviser in Korea Langdon to the Secretary of State
received January 5, 1947.

The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State
CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL , January [4?], 1947.
[Received January 5—1:36 p.m.]
1. Because of the: (a) Prevalent unrest following the first and fruitless anniversary of the Moscow
decision,2 (b) the recrudescent suspicion here and perhaps in North Korea that we are setting up a
separate government in our zone, (c) the exaggerated ideas of itself and its functions held by the
Interim Legislative Assembly, (d) the confusion being created in the minds of some Koreans by
Dr. Rhee’s3 campaign and publicity for immediate independence under an undefined South Korean
aegis, General Hodge4 is releasing following statement 4 January.5
“In Cairo in December 1943 and again at Potsdam in July 1945, the President of the US approved
for his country a formal declaration of the Allied Powers that Korea should in due course become
free and independent. Realizing the insecurity of Korea, a small defenseless nation in a troubled
postwar world, the US at the Moscow Conference in December 1945 bound itself in an agreement
with other major powers as to the general procedure by which Korean freedom and independence
would be achieved. This agreement, known as the Moscow Decision, provides for the development
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of a democratic, unified government for all Korea with the initial assistance by the US, USSR,
England, and China. Through this agreement, the Allied Powers assured the world that blood, lives
and resources expended by them in making possible that liberation of Korea, would bear fruit and
not be wasted, and that Korea would be independent.
[Page 597]
The Secretary of State of the US, speaking for his Government, has recently publicly reaffirmed
the unchanging intention of the US in the following words:
‘The (State) Dept and the Government’s policy is the same as it always has been and as I have
stated several times our policy is to bring about the unification of a free and democratic Korea. We
intend to stay there until we have been successful in doing it’
In order to fulfill its commitments to Korea and to the Allied Powers, the US Government placed
forces in Korea and has designated the CG of these forces to act as its agent with broad powers.
Included in his directives, in addition to his responsibility for commanding of US forces in Korea,
is the requirement that he exercise executive power for governing the American Occupied Zone,
until the provisional government of all Korea is established or as the executive head of the
government within this area, the CG USAFIK, has designated a principal assistant as military
governor to act as his deputy in handling the details of the civil government. Either through lack of
knowledge of facts or though malicious intent to deceive the Korean people, certain elements are
creating the impression that the US now favors and is actively working toward a separate
government in Southern Korea; and that the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly is a completely
independent body designed as the forerunner of that government.
Both of the above assumptions are incorrect and dangerous conclusions, entirely without
justification, and contrary to the announced basic policies of the US and the other great Allied
Powers who liberated Korea from the Japanese. In furtherance of the US policy and in order to
prepare South Koreans for democratic self-government, the CG, through his deputy for military
government, has been progressively drawing Koreans into governmental activities in order that
they may, to the maximum extent possible, gain experience and take over governmental
responsibility pending establishment of their unified government. This does not mean that he
intends to or that he can under his directives shirk his responsibility as executive, or completely
transfer his executive power to any other agency until the provisional government of unified Korea
is formed. At the same time it is the repeatedly announced and continuing intention of the
American Commander to give to Koreans the maximum possible freedom in operation of the
agencies of government assisted as required by American advisors and to further all legitimate and
proper aspirations of the people of Southern Korea for independence.
The Legislative Assembly is a body established with extensive powers under order No. 118
designed to give Koreans greater influence and voice in the affairs of Southern Korea. It is a great
step forward and offers a great opportunity for the Korean people to develop their nation. It may
draft legislation lead[ing] into [to] important political, economic, and social reforms pending the
establishment of the provisional governmment. However, it must remain clear to all that the
legislature is not a government within itself, nor is it the governing body of South Korea. It is
exactly what its name implies: An Interim Legislative Assembly with legislative powers to make
laws and [for?] enforcement by the executive branch of government, and to assist the [Page
598]executive branch in carrying out government of South Korean according to the will of the
Korean people pending the establishment of Korean provisional government under the Moscow
Decision.
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As previously stated, I and my assistants, in accordance with the policy of the US Government,
will continue to work for a united Korea, governed by a democratic provisional government
created in accordance with recognized international agreements and with the expressed will of the
Korean people which will lead to the independence of Korea as a nation united North and South
into one. The desire of the Korean people to achieve unity, dependence and democracy can best be
realized by full knowledge of and adherence to the foregoing policies. Efforts to undermine or
oppose these policies for selfish political or personal gains can only bring harmful results, and
delay the progress of your nation. The Korean people must know and recognize facts as they exist
and should not follow the will-of-the-wisp of purely wishful thinking. Those who support and aid
in the development of the Korean Government within the framework of the policies will make the
greatest possible contribution to the cause of early Korean independence.[”]
The 7th: General Hodge is also releasing the general contents of General Chistiakov’s letter of
November 26 and his reply thereto of December 24.6 This is considered advisable in order that the
South Korean people may be acquainted with the exchange of letters and any doubts that may exist
in their minds about our loyalty to the Moscow decision dispelled.
LANGDON
Source: Langdon. 1947. “The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State.”
Foreign Relations of the United States 1947, The Far East, Volume VI. Document 462.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d462.

Figure B5: US Ambassador to Korea Gleysteen’s Report “Crackdown in Seoul” to the Secretary
of State from May 17, 1980
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Source: Gleysteen, William H. 1980. “Crackdown in Seoul,” May 17, 1980, Gwangju
Declassified: The Cherokee Files, Box 1, File 1: Kwangju: US Reports.
https://timshorrock.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/CRACKDOWN-IN-SEOUL-MAY-171980.pdf
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Figure B6: US Ambassador to Korea Gleysteen’s Report “The Kwangju Crisis” to the Secretary
of State from May 21, 1980

Source: Gleysteen, William H. 1980. “The Kwangju Crisis,” May 21, 1980, Gwangju
Declassified: The Cherokee Files, Box 1, File 1: Kwangju: US Reports.
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https://timshorrock.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/CRACKDOWN-IN-SEOUL-MAY-171980.pdf
Figure B7: President Carter’s letter to South Korean interim President Choi Kyu-ha on January
1, 1980

Source: Carter, Jimmy. 1980. “Carter Letter January 1980,” January 1, 1980, Gwangju
Declassified: The Cherokee Files, Key FOIA documents on Gwangju 5.18.
https://timshorrock.com/wp-content/uploads/CHEROKEE-FILES-Carter-letter-January-1980.pdf
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